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 CHAPTER ONE 
   Introduction 
 
1.1 Introduction and background to the research 
 
Global warming, and the resultant climate change, is one of the greatest challenges facing 
international trade.1 Altered weather patterns will re-shape important sectors of economic 
activity, such as agriculture, fisheries, and tourism.2 According to the Fourth Assessment 
Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), ‘*w+arming of the climate 
system is unequivocal, as is now evident from observations of increases in global average air 
and ocean temperatures, widespread melting of snow and ice, and rising global average sea 
level’.3 It is estimated that over the last century the global average surface temperature has 
increased by about 0.74oC.4As greenhouse gas emissions (GHG) and temperatures increase, 
the impacts from climate change also increase and intensify.5 Developing and least 
developed countries, and particularly the poorest and marginalised populations within these 
countries, will generally be the most adversely affected by the impacts of future climate 
                                                          
1
 It is important to note that there is a difference between global warming and climate change, although they 
are often used interchangeably. Global warming refers to the increase of the earth’s average surface 
temperature, due to a build-up of greenhouse gases in the atmosphere, while climate change is used in a 
broader context that refers to a long- term changes in climate, including average temperature and 
precipitation. 
2
 WTO-UNEP Report ‘Trade and Climate Change’ A Report by the United Nations Environment Program and the 
World Trade Organisation, (2009) 64 available at 
http://www.wto.org/english/res_e/booksp_e/flyer_trade_climate_change_e.pdf (accessed 15 November 
2010) (hereafter WTO-UNEP Report). Climate change can further affect international trade in two ways. First, 
climate change may alter countries’ comparative advantages and lead to shifts in the pattern of international 
trade. This effect will be stronger on those countries whose comparative advantage stems from climatic or 
geophysical factors. Countries or regions that are more reliant on agriculture may experience a reduction in 
exports if future warming and more frequent extreme weather events result in a reduction in crop yields. 
Second, climate change may increase the vulnerability of the supply, transport and distribution chains upon 
which international trade depends.  
3
 IPCC Report ‘Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change’ Fourth Assessment Report of the 
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, (2007) 30 available at http://www.ipcc.ch/pdf/assessment-
report/ar4/syr/ar4_syr.pdf (accessed 18 December 2010) (hereafter IPCC Report).  
4
 WTO-UNEP Report (2009) vii. 
5
IPCC Report (2007) 30. 
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change and be the most vulnerable to effects, because they are less able to adapt than 
developed countries and their populations.6 
 
There is a nexus between trade and climate change. By enabling world-wide consumption of 
fossil fuels and emissions-intensive products, trade has negatively affected climate and 
continues to do so.7 The links between climate change policy and international trade 
regulation are even tighter. Climate change policy, pursuing climate mitigation and 
adaptation goals, might need to use trade-restrictive measures, which might even be 
authorised by a future international climate agreement.8 At the same time, trade-related 
measures of climate change policy have to comply with World Trade Organisation (WTO) 
law.9Climate change, for its part, is expected to substantially influence trade, especially with 
respect to agricultural products.10Moreover, the increase in global trade has significant 
environmental effects.11 These include: the consumption (and depletion) of natural 
resources, such as fish, wood and minerals; pollution stemming from extraction and 
manufacturing processes; the generation of wastes from manufacturing processes and 
consumed goods; and, of course, the vast usage of energy in the conveying and 
transportation of goods.12 In response to these threats, the conference of the parties of the 
UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), by its decision 1/CP.13 (the Bali 
Action Plan), launched negotiations to enable the full, effective and sustained 
                                                          
6
 WTO-UNEP Report (2007) viii. 
7
Holzer K ‘Trade and Climate Change Interaction: Dealing with WTO Law Inconsistencies of Carbon Related 
Adjustment Measures’ Research paper (2010) 1 available at 
http://stockholm.sgir.eu/uploads/Holzer_Working%20paper_23sept.pdf (accessed 9 January 2011). 
8
Holzer K (2010) 1. 
9
Holzer K (2010) 1. 
10
Holzer K (2010) 1. 
11
 WTO-UNEP Report (2009) 49-50. This is mainly through three effects – scale, composition and technique 
effect that trade and climate change linkages are determined. Increase in the level of trade and trade 
liberalisation will certainly lead to an increase in the scale of production and the resultant effect will be an 
increase in the extent of the GHG emissions. This is referred to as the ‘scale effect’. Trade opening changes the 
share that each sector represents in a country’s production in response to changes in relative prices, resulting 
in the expansion of some sectors and the contraction of others. The consequent increase or decrease of GHG 
will depend on whether the emission-intensive sectors are expanding or contracting. This is termed the 
‘composition effect’. Related to this concept is the ‘technique effect’: Trade liberalisation can also improve the 
methods by which goods and services are produced. 
12
Feris L ‘Multilateral trade policies and measures in post-Kyoto structures’ in Drapers P & Mbirimi I (eds) 
Climate Change & Trade : The Challenges for Southern Africa (2010) 101-102. 
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implementation of the UNFCCC through long–term co-operative action, up to and beyond 
2012.13 While the Bali Action Plan did not agree on specific numbers in order to cut GHG 
emissions, there was a strong consensus for a regime beyond 2012 stemming from both 
developed and developing countries, and many countries agreed that such a regime should 
employ ‘deep cuts in global emissions’ and that developed country emissions must fall 10-
40 per cent by 2020.14 Recently, delegates at the Cancun Conference produced a package 
dubbed the ‘Cancun Agreements’. Delegates agreed to aspects of a global framework to 
help developing countries curb their carbon output and cope with the effects of climate 
change, but they postponed the question of precisely how industrialised and emerging 
economies will share the task of making deeper GHG emissions cuts.15 
 
The current climate change regime does not prescribe specific policies, but leaves it up to 
parties to decide how they will achieve their commitments. This creates policy space for 
countries to implement a range of both multilateral measures prescribed by the climate 
change regime and domestic measures. A number of these measures are trade-related or 
have the potential to impact on trade.16 Developed countries have taken advantage of this 
policy space by proposing the imposition of climate-related tariffs, often called border tax 
adjustments (BTAs) or border carbon adjustments (BCAs).17 In theory, these adjustments, 
comprising either a tax on imports or a rebate for exports, would offset any competitive 
advantage other countries would gain through the absence of carbon constraints.18 The 
motivation for BCAs can be looked at from three perspectives: to protect domestic 
industries from competitive disadvantages due to unequal international carbon prices 
                                                          
13
http://unfccc.int/meetings/items/4381.php. (accessed 5 February 2011).  
14
Feris L (2010) 97. 
15
http://www.navhindtimes.in/opinion/failure-cancun-climate-summit (accessed 12 February 2011). 
16
Feris L (2010) 97. 
17
 The term BTAs specifically refers to tax measures, but the taxes could be imposed for any reason (including 
e.g. revenue collection). The term BCAs, on the other hand, applies to measures with a specific purpose – to 
reduce carbon emissions – but includes any measure imposed at the border aiming at an equalisation policy 
treatment of the embedded carbon content of like foreign and domestic products, regardless of whether the 
measure takes the form of a tax or a regulation. This mini-thesis will adopt the term BCAs since this research is 
concerned with adjustment schemes in the context of climate policy.  
18
 Melendez-Ortiz R ‘Anticipating pressing Issues in Integration: The trade, climate and sustainable 
development nexus’ (2010) 23 available at 
http://www.iadb.org/intal/ICom/30/eng/pdf/i_INTAL_I&T_30_2010_Melendez_Biswas_Jegou.pdf23 (accessed 
13 November 2010). 
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(competitive concern); to prevent the re-location of energy or emission intensive companies 
from countries with a high carbon price to areas with a low or non-existent price on carbon 
(carbon leakage concern); and to induce other countries to pursue more ambitious climate 
policies and join a post 2012 international agreement on climate policy (free riding 
concern).19The imposition of these measures to curb climate change creates interesting 
puzzles in that their imposition by developed countries may conflict with WTO laws. This 
raises the question of whether the measures can be accommodated under the WTO rules. 
1.2 Problem statement 
 
This mini-thesis focuses on the legality or otherwise of BCAs with WTO/GATT law. In 
addressing the legality question, two distinct issues will be analysed. First, are BCAs 
categorically impermissible? Secondly, assuming BCAs are not categorically impermissible, 
how can they be justified within the WTO legal framework? 
 
In principle, border adjustment is an allowed practice under WTO law, provided that certain 
conditions are met.20 However, BCAs are viewed from the WTO perspective as special 
measures, because they are not imposed on products directly, but on the process and 
production methods (PPMs).21 The PPMs nature of BCAs makes their legality disputable. The 
legal status of non-product related PPMs is not clear. The main issues here are the likeness 
of different PPMs products and the product-process distinction. These issues raise a number 
of legal questions. For instance: can taxes levied on production methods qualify as indirect 
                                                          
19
Brandi C ‘International trade and climate change: Border adjustment measures and developing countries’ 
Briefing paper (2010) available at 
 http://www.die-gdi.de/CMS-Homepage/openwebcms3.nsf/(ynDK_contentByKey)/ANES-
873HC2/$FILE/BP%2011.2010.pdf (accessed 18 December 2010). 
20
 WTO Working Party Report ‘Border Tax Adjustment’ A Report of the World Trade Organisation on Border 
Tax Adjustments, L/3463 (1970) (hereafter Working Party Report).The principal source of clarification on 
border adjustment is the Report of the Working Party on Border Tax Adjustments which was adopted by the 
GATT membership on 2 December 1970. While this document is a working party report which merely 
examines issues and does not purport to have binding legal effect, subsequent to its adoption by the GATT 
membership it has been cited by various GATT and WTO panels. In paragraph 14 of the report, the working 
party places a limitation on the types of taxes which are eligible for BTAs. Indirect taxes, such as specific excise 
duties, sales taxes and cascade taxes and the tax on value added are amenable to border tax adjustments. 
Thus indirect taxes are taxes that can be passed on to the consumers while direct taxes, such as social security 
charges or payroll taxes, are not eligible for border tax adjustments.  
21
Holzer K (2010) 7. 
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taxes and thus be adjusted? Or, can two PPMs-non-identical products be considered not 
like? In other words, is it possible to treat products differently depending on the amount of 
GHGs emitted during their production?22 
 
In addressing these issues, there are several provisions under the GATT on which this thesis 
will focus. First, this research examines the provision of Article II: 2 (a) of the GATT, which is 
to the effect that WTO members may impose on imports ‘a charge equivalent to an internal 
tax imposed consistently with the provisions of paragraph 2 of Article III in respect of the 
like domestic product or in respect of an Article from which the imported product has been 
manufactured or produced in whole or in part’. Although this provision allows WTO 
members to impose BTAs on imports in respect of taxes and other charges imposed at a 
prior stage, the provision raises the issue of whether GATT Article II: 2 (a) should be 
interpreted along the lines that only taxes imposed on ‘physically incorporated inputs’ are 
eligible for adjustment on the import of the ‘like’ final product. 
 
Secondly, this mini-thesis examines the provision of Article III: 2 of the GATT which prohibits 
discriminatory taxation against foreign ‘like products’ or ‘directly competitive or 
substitutable products’. In case of the discriminatory taxation against foreign ‘like products’, 
taxes applied to the imported products in excess of the domestic like products will be 
inconsistent with GATT Article III: 2. While no legal definition of ‘likeness’ exists, the 
Appellate Body (AB) in the Japan–Alcoholic Beverages23 case listed factors that determine 
likeness. These factors included the product’s end use in a given market; consumers’ tastes 
and habits; the product’s properties, nature and quality; and the product’s tariff 
classifications.  The AB has made it clear that the concept of likeness is one that needs to be 
addressed on a case-by-case basis; the four criteria are simply tools to assist in the task of 
sorting and examining the relevant evidence, and do not constitute a closed list of criteria 
that determine the legal characterisation of products.24 The main crux of this provision as it 
relates to BCAs is whether products may be considered ‘unlike’ because of differences in the 
                                                          
22
Holzer K (2010) 7. 
23
 Appellate Body Report Japan–Taxes on Alcoholic Beverages, WT/DS8/AB/R, WT/DS10/AB/R, WT/DS11/AB/R, 
adopted 1 November 1996, DSR 1996: I, 97(hereafter Japan–Alcoholic Beverages II). 
24
Japan–Alcoholic Beverages II p. 20. 
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way in which they have been produced (PPMs) even if the physical characteristics of the 
final product remain identical.  
 
Thirdly this mini-thesis examines Article I of the GATT, which provides for the Most-
Favoured-Nation (MFN) principle. This principle is to the effect that any advantage granted 
by any member to any product originating in or destined for any other country shall be 
accorded immediately and unconditionally to the like product originating in the territories of 
all WTO members. This requirement is violated if BCAs regulation imposes requirements on 
the importation of industrial products from a WTO member that does not engage in the 
post-Kyoto regime, while such a measure is not imposed on the ‘like product’ from another 
state. This principle is particularly relevant to BCAs if the implementing countries take a 
country-based approach, basing the distinction on national origin rather than environmental 
concern.25 
 
Assuming BCAs conflict with any of the above-mentioned Articles, can they be justified 
under the general exception provided for by Article XX? Two exceptions are of particular 
relevance to the protection of the environment: paragraphs (b) and (g). According to these 
two paragraphs, WTO members may adopt policy measures that are inconsistent with GATT 
disciplines, but necessary to protect human, animal or plant life or health (paragraph(b), or, 
related to the conservation of exhaustible natural resources, paragraph(g)). GATT Article XX 
consists of two cumulative requirements. For a GATT inconsistent environmental measure 
to be justified under Article XX, a member must perform a two-tier analysis proving first that 
its measure falls under at least one of the exceptions (there are ten exceptions, including 
paragraphs(b) and (g)) and secondly that the measure satisfies the requirement of the 
chapeau of Article XX, i.e. that it is not applied in a manner which would constitute ‘a means 
of arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination between countries where the same conditions 
prevail’, and is not ‘a disguised restriction on international trade’. However, the crux as it 
                                                          
25
Kommerskollegium Report ‘Climate measures and trade: Legal and economic aspects of border carbon 
adjustment’ A report by the Sweden National Board of Trade (2009) 8 available at 
http://www.kommers.se/upload/Analysarkiv/In%20English/Report%20Climate_Measures_and_Trade.pdf(acce
ssed 10 February 2011). 
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relates to BCAs is whether countries proposing the imposition of BCAs can satisfy this 
requirement so as to enable them to justify the imposition of the measure.26 
 
Finally, this research work examines the likely institutional solutions within the WTO and/or 
UNFCCC which will provide a long-lasting institutional solution to the likely conflict of BCAs 
with WTO rules. This is premised on the fact that justification under Article XX can only be 
achieved through litigation between the parties concerned and this implies that the likely 
violation of WTO rules will have to be resolved anew each time.27 Therefore, there needs to 
be a long-lasting institutional solution to the likely violation of WTO rules by the 
implementation of BCAs measures. 
1.3 Research question 
 
The main research question that this study seeks to answer is whether BCAs measures can 
be justified within the WTO/GATT legal framework. 
In answering the main question, the following questions will be answered: 
i. What are BCA measures? 
ii. What are the legal requirements for the compatibility of BCAs measures under the 
GATT/WTO rules? 
iii. What are the ways of achieving compatibility under the GATT/WTO provisions? 
iv. What are the likely institutional solutions within the WTO and/or UNFCCC that can 
be adopted to address the possible conflict of BCAs measures with WTO rules? 
1.4 Research hypothesis 
 
This mini-thesis argues that the imposition of BCAs will no doubt be faced with some 
constraints under the existing WTO legal framework, but may, however, be legally 
permissible under the general exception clause. This mini-thesis further argues that 
                                                          
26
 The imposition of BCAs may, however, be justified under WTO law depending on how they are structured by 
the implementing countries. It can be argued that one of the objectives of BCAs is to control carbon leakage 
and ultimately decrease carbon consumption on a global level and that this makes their imposition justifiable 
under article XX (g) of the GATT. An in-depth legal analysis is contained in Chapter Three. 
27
 There are different institutional solutions and they include: first, to initiate negotiations among WTO 
members to reach an understanding or possibly enter into agreement on BCAs; secondly, to adopt a protocol 
or resolution on trade-related climate policy measures among the parties to the UNFCCC; thirdly, the 
establishment of a joint WTO-UNFCCC working group on climate-related border measures. 
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Regional Trade Agreements (RTAs) can be adopted as an institutional response to address 
the likely violation of WTO rules by BCA measures. 
1.5 Rationale for the research 
 
Climate change is a global challenge that requires a global answer. Therefore it represents 
more than a traditional environmental challenge that can be dealt with by specialised 
negotiators and environmental agencies alone. It will have, and already has had, significant 
impacts on all of society, including the economy. 
 
In light of this, it is imperative to research on the unilateral measures employed by states to 
mitigate the effects of climate change, considering its economic and environmental 
implications. 
 
However, the main objective of this mini-thesis is to critically analyse, based on the WTO 
jurisprudence, the legality of BCAs under the existing WTO legal framework and to provide 
some food for thought for future discussions. This analysis is imperative because both the 
UNFCCC and WTO agreement entail a set of principles that oppose the use of unilateral 
trade measures that constitute a means of arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination or 
disguised restrictions on international trade.28 
 
This mini-thesis also seeks to examine likely institutional solutions within the WTO or 
UNFCCC which will provide a long lasting solution to the likely conflict with WTO rules that 
may arise from the implementation of BCAs measures. 
1.6 Research methods 
 
The approach to be adopted in this mini-thesis is one of descriptive, analytical and critical 
assessment. The descriptive approach will be applied to describe the existing factual situation. 
The analytical approach will be used to analyse the GATT/WTO legal framework on border 
                                                          
28
 In accessing whether border measures are protectionist in nature or not, the following questions have to be 
considered. First, how compatible are they with the International regulation on trade? Secondly and more 
importantly, will BCAs indeed achieve their main objective, which is to lower the GHG emissions of trading 
partners? Thirdly, are there more efficient ways (i.e. without distorting trade) of bringing about this outcome? 
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measures to examine whether BCAs measures are accommodated within the GATT/WTO legal 
framework. The analytical approach will also entail an analysis of trade and environment 
disputes which have been decided by the WTO adjudicative bodies. Lastly, the critical 
assessment approach will be used to assess the various institutional approaches available to 
address the likely violation of GATT rules by the implementation of BCAs measures. 
 
Intensive library research and a desk–top literature based review will be adopted. This will 
entail gathering and analysing available literature from the library and the internet. The 
primary sources of information will include the GATT, the Kyoto Protocol, the UNFCCC, the 
WTO Appellate Body and Panel Reports, while the secondary sources of information will 
include journal articles, working papers, briefing papers, textbooks, and reports and papers 
from other authoritative sources. 
1.7 Significance of study 
 
First, this mini-thesis aims at highlighting the linkages between trade and climate change 
and also the impact of climate change on the trade of African countries. This study is 
relevant considering the negative impact future climate change may have on the trade of 
African countries and on the flow of international trade generally. 
 
Secondly, the interpretation of Article III of the GATT as to what constitutes ‘like products’ 
notwithstanding differences in the carbon emitted during production is still very 
contentious; so too is the interpretation of Article XX as to whether BCAs can be justified 
under the environmental exceptions clauses of GATT Article XX, as a measure ‘necessary to 
protect human, animal or plant life or health’ (paragraph (b)), or as a measure ‘relating to 
the conservation of exhaustible natural resources’ (paragraph (g)). Research into this 
controversial area is also very relevant considering that no climate-related dispute has ever 
been adjudicated by the WTO adjudicative bodies. 
 
This mini-thesis would also serve as contribution to the general jurisprudence of 
international trade law and as a point of academic reference for students and researchers. 
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1.8 Chapter structure 
 
Chapter One is an introductory chapter; it contains: the introduction to the mini-thesis, the 
problem statement, the research question, the rationale for the research, the significance of 
the research and the research methods. 
 
Chapter Two is divided into four parts. The first part discusses the current state of 
knowledge of climate change. The second part traces the multilateral response to climate 
change and highlights the successes so far in reaching an international agreement on 
climate change. The third part examines the linkages between climate change and trade. 
The fourth part examines the impact of climate change on trade in Africa by highlighting the 
various sectors that will be adversely affected by the impact. 
 
Chapter Three examines the legality of BCAs under WTO law and explores the likely 
constraints that WTO law places on the implementation of such measures. This chapter also 
analyses key WTO disputes relating to trade and environment. 
 
Chapter Four explores the likely institutional solutions within the WTO and UNFCCC that can 
be adopted to address the problem of inconsistency of BCAs measures with the WTO rules. 
This chapter highlights the available options and their advantages and disadvantages. 
 
Chapter Five sets out conclusions derived from the research and makes possible 
recommendations. 
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CHAPTER TWO 
 
Current knowledge of climate change and its impact on trade 
 
2.1 Introduction 
 
Debates on climate change and trade have become intertwined over the last few years. The 
reasons for this can be viewed from two perspectives. First, there is an undeniable link 
between economic growth, international trade and carbon emissions. Any attempt at 
dealing with climate change requires changes in growth and trade patterns. Secondly, an 
important element of climate change mitigation and adaptation involves the dissemination 
and transfer of technology, which comes under the domain of international trade.29 
 
However, as countries focus on addressing the likely impact of climate change, trade 
remains largely unchartered territory. Sectors that provide the greatest trade potential for 
many African countries, such as agriculture, tourism and fishing, will be most affected by the 
impact of climate change.30 
 
This chapter begins with an overview of the current state of knowledge on climate change. 
This is followed by an overview of the multilateral responses to address climate change. This 
overview examines the various multilateral efforts adopted by states to address climate 
change. The chapter then further examines the linkages between trade and climate change, 
and the final section of the chapter discusses the impact of climate change on the trade of 
African countries. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
29
 Nair S ‘Unilateral carbon border measures: effectiveness and alternatives’ in Mikic M (ed) Rising Non-Tariff 
Protectionism and Crisis Recovery (2010) 137.  
30
 Kamal Gueye M, Hepburn J, Sugathan M et al ‘Climate adaptation and trade: Key challenges and options for 
agriculture in small developing countries’ in Climate and Trade Policies in a Post-2012 World (2009) 43. 
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2.2 Background on climate change 
 
Climate change looms as a defining issue of the 21st century, pitting the potential disruption 
of our global climate system against the future of a fossil-fuel based economy. The possible 
environmental consequences are overwhelming, as are the measures that may be needed 
to mitigate or avoid them.31 Yet there is substantial disagreement about the precise nature 
of the threats posed by climate change and about the appropriate use of the law to respond 
to climate change.32 The Stern Review, considered by many as the most authoritative study 
on the economics of climate change, has calculated that the impacts of unabated climate 
change would be equivalent to a loss of at least 5 per cent of global gross domestic product 
(GDP). This led Stern to conclude that climate change is the ‘greatest market failure the 
world has ever seen’.33 As United Nations Secretary-General Ban Ki-Moon aptly noted, 
climate change is ‘the defining challenge of our age’.34According to the Fourth Assessment 
Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate change (IPCC), climate change:  
[R]efers to a change in the state of the climate that can be identified (e.g. using statistical 
tests) by changes in the mean and/or the variability of its properties, and that persists for an 
extended period, typically decades or longer. It refers to any change in climate over time, 
whether due to natural variability or as a result of human activity.
35
 
 
The primary cause of global warming is the emission of greenhouse gases (GHGs) stemming 
from human activities.36 The warming effect of the GHGs, called the ‘greenhouse effect’ or 
‘natural greenhouse effect’, results in the average surface temperature being + 140C. Two 
gases, carbon dioxide (CO2) and water vapour, are responsible for most of the greenhouse 
                                                          
31
Ruhl JB, Nagle JC, Salzmann J et al The Practice and Policy of Environmental Law 2 ed (2010) 649 (hereafter 
Ruhl JB, Nagle JC & Salzmann J). 
32
Ruhl JB, Nagle JC & Salzmann J (2010) 647. 
33
Stern, N ‘Stern Review: The Economics of Climate Change’ (2006) 1 available at 
http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTINDONESIA/Resources/226271-1170911056314/3428109-
1174614780539/SternReviewEng.pdf (accessed 18 November 2010). 
34
 United Nations Secretary-General Ban Ki-Moon’s address to the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change 
(IPCC) upon the release of the Fourth Assessment Synthesis Report (2007) available at 
http://www.unep.org/Documents.Multilingual/Default.asp?DocumentID=522&ArticleID=5708&l=en 
35
 IPCC Report ‘Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change’ Fourth Assessment Report of the 
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (2007) 30 available at http://www.ipcc.ch/pdf/assessment-
report/ar4/syr/ar4_syr.pdf. (hereafter IPCC Report). 
36
Rechtschaffen C, Gauna E & O’ Neil AC Environmental Justice Law, Policy & Regulation 2 ed (2009) 390  
(hereafter Rechtschaffen C, Gauna E & O’Neil). 
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effect.
37The most widespread effect of the GHGs is carbon dioxide, emitted as a result of the 
combustion of fossil fuel, such as, coal, natural gas, and oil. Other GHGs include methane, 
primarily from agriculture and landfills; gases used in refrigerants; nitrous oxide, also 
stemming largely from agriculture and fuel burning; and black carbon, a form of air pollution 
produced by biomass burning, diesel exhaust and other sources.38 
 
The impacts of climate change are already being felt. Global average temperatures have 
increased over the past 100 years by about 0.74oC (1.33 oF) and 11 of the most recent 12 
years (1995 – 2006) rank among the 12 warmest years since we began keeping records 150 
years ago. The current global climate is warmer than it has ever been during the past 500 
years, and probably warmer than it has been for more than 1000 years. Moreover, the rate 
of temperature rise is unprecedented.39 Climate change may also have profound 
implications for regional conflicts and global security, as millions of residents are displaced 
from their homes and conflicts develop over increasingly scarce food, water and other 
natural resources.40 One recent analysis concludes that ‘*c]limate change acts as a threat 
multiplier for instability in some of the most volatile regions of the world.’41 Projected 
climate change will seriously exacerbate already marginal living standards in many Asian, 
African and Middle Eastern nations, causing widespread political instability and the 
likelihood of failed states.42 
 
However, despite international concern about global warming and associated climate 
change, GHG concentrations in the earth’s atmosphere are set to increase at an accelerated 
rate.43 Over the last half century, GHG emissions per person in industrialised countries have 
                                                          
37
Rechtschaffen C, Gauna E & O’ Neil AC (2009) 390. 
38
Engelbrecht F ‘The scientific basis for climate change over Southern Africa’ in Drapers P &Mbirimi I (eds) 
Climate Change & Trade : The Challenges for Southern Africa (2010) 127. 
39
Rechtschaffen C, Gauna E & O’ Neil AC (2009) 390. 
40
Rechtschaffen C, Gauna E & O’ Neil AC (2009) 391. 
41
Rechtschaffen C, Gauna E & O’ Neil AC(2009) 391. 
42
Rechtschaffen C, Gauna E & O’ Neil AC(2009) 391-92. 
43
Engelbrecht F (2010) 128. Engelbrecht noted that If current trends in emission rates persist, the 
concentration of CO2 (responsible for most of the enhanced greenhouse effect) will exceed 560 parts per 
million (ppm) –  double its natural concentration – by about 2050. At GHG levels of 550 ppm CO2 equivalent, 
the likelihood of exceeding a global temperature increase of 2
o
C (thought to define dangerous climate change) 
is high. It has been estimated that GHG concentrations need to stabilise at values of between 400 and 450 
ppm (or less) for dangerous climate change to be avoided. 
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been around four times higher than emissions per person in developing countries, and for 
the least- developed countries the difference is even greater.44 
 
Historically, industrialised countries have produced large amounts of energy-related 
emissions of carbon dioxide, and their share of responsibility for the present atmospheric 
concentration of GHGs includes their accumulated past emissions. The members of the 
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), which are the world’s 
most industrialised countries, are responsible for an estimated 77 per cent of the total GHGs 
which were emitted in the past. The emissions from developing countries, however, are 
becoming increasingly significant: it is estimated that between 2005 and 2030, the GHGs 
levels from non-OECD countries are expected to increase by an average of 2.5 per cent each 
year, whereas the projected average annual increase for OECD countries is 0.5 percent.45 
 
The projections of future climate change and its associated impacts amply illustrate the 
need for increased efforts focused on climate change mitigation and adaptation. ‘Mitigation’ 
refers to policies and options aimed at reducing GHG emissions or at enhancing the ‘sinks’ 
(such as oceans or forests) which absorb carbon or carbon dioxide from the atmosphere. 
‘Adaptation’ on the other hand refers to the adjustment in natural or human systems in 
response to actual or expected climatic stimuli or their effects, which moderates harm or 
exploits beneficial opportunities.46 In other words, mitigation attempts to reduce the rate 
and magnitude of climate change and its associated impacts, whereas adaptation increases 
the ability of people or natural systems to cope with the consequences of the impacts of 
                                                          
44
WTO-UNEP Report   ‘Trade and Climate Change’ A Report by the United Nations Environment Program and 
the World Trade Organisation (2009) 4-5 available at 
http://www.wto.org/english/res_e/booksp_e/trade_climate_change_e.pdf (accessed 15 November 2010) 
(hereafter WTO-UNEP Report). 
45
WTO-UNEP Report (2009) 4-5. 
46
 See generally WTO-UNEP Report (2009) 24. It is important to note that the capacity to adapt and mitigate is 
dependent on socio-economic and environmental circumstances and the availability of information and 
technology. However, much less information is available about the costs and effectiveness of adaptation 
measures than about mitigation measures. The capacity to adapt is dynamic and is influenced by a society’s 
productive base, including natural and man-made capital assets, social networks and entitlements, human 
capital and institutions, governance, national income, health and technology. It is also affected by multiple 
climate and non-climate stresses, as well as development policy. 
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climatic changes, including increased climate variability and the occurrence of extreme 
weather.47 
 
Mitigation and adaptation also differ in terms of timescales and geographical location. 
Although the costs of emission reductions are often specific to the location where the 
reduction scheme is brought into action, the benefits of mitigation are global, since 
emission reductions contribute to decreasing overall atmospheric concentrations of GHGs, 
regardless of the geographical location of the emission-reduction activities. Moreover, 
mitigation benefits are long-term because of the long atmospheric lifetimes of most GHGs 
and the resulting time lapse between the moment of emission and the response by the 
climate system.48 Adaptation, by contrast, is characterised by benefits in the short-to-
medium term, and both the costs and the benefits are primarily local. 49 
 
2.3  Multilateral response to climate change 
 
Following the adoption of numerous declarations at regional conferences calling for various 
measures to be taken to reduce the generation of CO2 and other GHGs, the elements of a 
climate change convention were first considered by a meeting of experts in Ottawa in 1989, 
and by the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change in 1990.50 This call for international 
co-operation led to the initiation of negotiations in 1990 by UN General Assembly resolution 
45/212, which was concluded in 1992 with the adoption at the Rio Conference (commonly 
referred to as the Earth Summit) of a Framework on Climate Change.51 The Earth Summit 
proved to be groundbreaking on many fronts: it was one of the first global dialogues on 
sustainable development and led to the Rio Declaration on Environment and 
                                                          
47
 WTO-UNEP Report (2009) 24. Both bottom-up and top-down studies indicate that there is high agreement 
as to, and much evidence of, substantial economic potential for the mitigation of global GHG emissions over 
the coming decades that could offset the projected growth of global emissions or reduce emissions below 
current levels. 
48
WTO-UNEP Report (2009) 25. 
49
 WTO-UNEP Report (2009) 25. 
50
Birnie P, Boyle A & Redgwell C International Law and the Environment 3 ed (2009) 356 (hereafter Birnie P, 
Boyle A & Redgwell C). 
51
Birnie P, Boyle A & Redgwell C (2009) 356. 
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Development.52 The Earth Summit was also crucial from a climate change perspective, as it 
led to the adoption of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change 
(UNFCCC) - the first global effort to address climate change.53 The UNFCCC, which entered 
into force in March 1994, represented a groundbreaking response to climate change by 
creating a general framework for action, but did not create legally-binding commitments for 
reducing GHG emissions.  
 
The ultimate objective of the UNFCCC is the ‘stabilization of greenhouse gas concentrations 
in the atmosphere at a level that would prevent dangerous anthropogenic interference (i.e. 
resulting from human activity) with the climate system.’54 The UNFCCC elaborates a number 
of principles to guide parties in reaching this objective: for instance, the UNFCCC calls on 
parties to employ precautionary measures to anticipate, prevent or minimise the causes of 
climate change and to mitigate its adverse effects.55 Where there are threats of serious or 
irreversible damage, lack of full scientific certainty shall not be used as a reason for 
postponing such measures, taking into account that policies and measures to deal with 
climate change should be cost-effective so as to ensure global benefits at the lowest cost 
possible.56 The UNFCCC also reflects the principle of ‘common but differentiated 
responsibilities’, a principle which recognises that even though all countries have a 
responsibility to address climate change, they have not all contributed to the same extent to 
causing the problem, nor are they all equally equipped to address it. Accordingly, the 
UNFCCC places the initial burden of GHG emission reductions on the most industrialised 
countries, given their disproportionate contribution to climate change since the beginning 
of the industrial revolution.57 
                                                          
52
 WTO-UNEP Report (2009) 69. 
53
 WTO-UNEP Report (2009) 68. 
54
 Article 2 UNFCCC. 
55
 Article 3(3) UNFCCC. 
56
 Article 3(3) UNFCCC. 
57
 Article 3 of the UNFCCC states that ‘parties should protect the climate system for the benefit of future and 
present generations of humankind on the basis of equity and in accordance with their common but 
differentiated responsibility and respective capabilities. Accordingly, developed countries should take the lead 
in combating climate change and the adverse effects thereof’. The word principle is notably absent from the 
text of Article 3,as the US, with support from other industrial nations, opposed the inclusion of the principle in 
the formation of the UNFCCC as it added uncertainty to treat obligations. Its inclusion is thus more a guiding 
ideal than prescriptive principle. While not a legal obligation in itself, the ideal of common but differentiated 
 
 
 
 
17 
 
In view of the non-binding commitments under the Earth Summit, there were increased 
calls for a supplementary agreement with legally-binding commitments for reducing GHG 
emissions. This increased political momentum ultimately led to the signing of the Kyoto 
Protocol in 1997. The Kyoto Protocol requires industrialised countries to meet agreed levels 
of emission reductions over an initial commitment period that runs from 2008-2012.58 It is 
important to note that the existing regime in the form of the Kyoto Protocol does not 
prescribe the measures for the stabilising and reducing of GHGs. However, it imposes 
individual caps on the emissions of Annex I countries.59 According to Article 4(2) (a) of the 
UNFCCC, Annex I parties are allowed to implement emissions reduction measures jointly 
with other parties. In achieving this, the Kyoto Protocol provides for three flexibility 
mechanisms, i.e. Joint Implementation (JI)60, the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM)61 
and the emissions trading also known as ‘the carbon market’62. 
 
Furthermore, the Kyoto Protocol has some advantages and disadvantages. Some of the 
advantages of the Kyoto Protocol include: first, it provides some flexibility for nations to 
meet their national emission targets - their commitments - in any way they want. In other 
words, Article 2 of the Protocol recognises domestic sovereignty by providing for flexibility 
at the national level. Secondly, the Kyoto Protocol has the appearance of fairness in that it 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
responsibility has provided the legal and philosophical basis for the existing legal obligations including the 
instruments designed to achieve the objectives of the Kyoto Protocol. available at 
http://www.climateoanalysis.org/wp-content/uploads/2009/12/kmcmanus/pdf(accessed 22 December 2010). 
58
The major distinction between the UNFCCC and the Kyoto Protocol is that while the UNFCCC encouraged 
industrialised countries to stabilise GHG emissions, the Kyoto Protocol commits them to do so. available at 
http://unfccc.int/kyoto_ps/2830.phprotocol/item   (accessed 20 January 2011). 
59
 Annex I parties refers to the industrialised countries which undertook to ‘return their GHG emissions to the 
levels by the year 2000’ under Article 4.2 (a) and (b) of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate 
Change. They also adopted emission reduction targets for the 2008-12 periods under the Kyoto Protocol. They 
include members of the OECD, the EU and 14 countries with ‘economies in transition’ 
60
 Article 6 Kyoto Protocol. This allows a country with an emission reduction or limitation commitment under 
the Kyoto Protocol (Annex B party) to earn emission reduction units (ERUs) from an emission-reduction or 
emission removal project in another Annex B party, each equivalent to one tone of CO2, which can be counted 
towards meeting its Kyoto Protocol target. 
61
 Article 3 Kyoto Protocol. The purpose of the CDM is to assist parties not included in Annex I in achieving 
sustainable development and in contributing to the ultimate objective of the UNCFCCC, and to assist parties 
included in Annex I in achieving compliance with their quantified emission limitation  and reduction 
commitments under Article 3.  
62
 Article 17 Kyoto Protocol. This allows countries that have emission units to spare – emissions permitted 
them but not ‘used’ – to sell this excess capacity to countries that have target. 
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focuses on the wealthiest countries and those responsible for the dominant share of the 
current stock of anthropogenic GHGs in the atmosphere. This is consistent with the principle 
enunciated in the UNFCCC of common but differentiated responsibilities and respective 
capacities.63 Thirdly, the fact that the Kyoto Protocol was signed by more than 180 countries 
and subsequently ratified by a sufficient number of Annex I countries for it to come into 
force speaks to the viability of the agreement, if not to the feasibility of all countries actually 
achieving their targets. Nevertheless, the disadvantages include: first, some of the world’s 
largest emitters are not constrained by the protocol. The United States (US) - until recently 
the country with the largest share of global emissions – has not ratified, and is unlikely to 
ratify, the agreement. Also, some of the largest and more rapidly-growing economies in the 
developing world do not have emission targets under the agreement.64 Another weakness 
of the Kyoto Protocol is associated with the relatively small number of countries being asked 
to take action. This narrow but deep approach may have been well-intended, but one of its 
effects will be to drive up the costs of producing carbon-intensive goods and services within 
the coalition of countries taking action.65 
 
In 2007, at the 13th UNFCCC Conference of Parties in Bali, Indonesia, parties decided to 
launch the Bali Action Plan to enable full, effective and sustained implementation of the 
convention through long-term co-operative action for now and beyond 2012. In terms of 
this negotiating mandate, a series of negotiating meetings have been scheduled and the 
process was set to conclude with an agreement in Copenhagen in December 2009.66  The 
purpose of the negotiations was to map out a path beyond the Kyoto Protocol. However, 
the final outcome, a three page non-binding statement, did not meet this goal,67 and 
basically does not include binding commitments to reduce GHG emissions, or binding 
agreement by any country to any specific target.68 
                                                          
63
Aldy JE & Stavins RN ‘Post-Kyoto international climate policy: Implementing architectures for agreement’ in 
Aldy JE & Stavins RN (eds) Post-Kyoto International Climate Policy: Implementing Architectures for Agreement 
(2010) 4-6 (hereafter Aldy JE & Stavins RN). 
64
 These countries include China, India, South Africa, Indonesia, Korea and Mexico.  
65
Aldy JE & Stavins RN (2010) 4-6. 
66
http://unfccc.int/meetings/ad_hoc_working_groups/lca/items/4381.php (accessed 15 March 2010).  
67
Feris L (2010) 101. 
68
 Bacchus J ‘Questions in Search of Answers: Trade, Climate, and the Rule of Law’ Keynote address (2010) 8 
available at 
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Further, in an effort to reach a post 2012 agreement on climate change, the UNFCCC held a 
conference from November 29 to December 11, 2010, in Cancun, Mexico. Delegates agreed 
to aspects of a global framework to help developing countries curb their carbon output and 
cope with the effects of climate change, but they postponed the harder question of 
precisely how industrialised and major emerging economies will share the task of making 
deeper GHG emissions cuts.69 
 
While the agreements in Cancun were more than what was expected at the outset, several 
key issues were dropped in order to reach consensus. Many of these issues relate to trade. 
Agriculture, which had not been considered to be one of the more difficult issues to 
negotiate, became inextricably tied to the discussions on bunker fuels.70 When it became 
clear that parties would be unable to overcome their differences on how to manage bunker 
fuels, the issue was snipped out of the text.71 Additionally, references to the use of 
unilateral trade measures such as BCAs were removed, leaving a crucial element of 
enforcement and regulation unresolved.72 
2.4 Climate change and trade linkages 
 
For the last ten years environmentalist and trade-policy communities have engaged in 
heated debate over the environmental consequences of liberalised trade.73 The debate was 
originally fuelled by negotiations over the North American Free Trade Agreement and the 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
http://graduateinstitute.ch/webdav/site/ctei/shared/CTEI/events/TAIT%202/Keynote_Bacchus_Final_Plus_Dis
cussions.pdf (accessed 16 February 2011). 
69
The final conference instrument, dubbed the ‘Cancun Agreements’, includes decisions under both the 
UNFCCC and Kyoto Protocol negotiating tracks. Agreements reached included: a shared vision for long term co-
operative action; adaptation to climate change; reducing emissions for deforestation and forest degradation in 
developing countries, and conservation and sustainable management of forests ; technology transfer co-
operation and capacity building; climate change mitigation; and finance to support climate action in 
developing countries. The Cancun Agreements received near universal acceptance with the exception of 
Bolivia, who described the agreements as ‘hollow and false’ available at 
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/earth/environment/climatechange/8197785/Cancun-climate-agreement-
Analysis-of-the-text.html (accessed 15 February 2011). 
70
 Bunker fuel is any type of fuel oil used aboard ships. The global nature of the industry makes it very difficult 
for parties to reach a conclusion on jurisdiction. 
71
http://ictsd.org/i/news/biores/98259/ (accessed 11 March 2011). 
72
http://ictsd.org/i/news/biores/98259/ (accessed 11 March 2011). 
73
 Copeland BR & Taylor MS ‘Trade, growth and the environment’ (2004) 42 Journal of Economic Literature 7 
(hereafter Copeland BR & Taylor MS). 
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Uruguay round negotiations, both of which occurred at a time when concerns over global 
warming, species extinction, and industrial pollution were rising.74 On the one hand, it is 
argued that trade liberalisation may change the pattern or nature of economic activity by 
increasing trade in dangerous products such as hazardous waste or chemicals.75 On the 
other hand, there are those who believe this debate is really much ado about nothing, as 
evidenced by the following: 
There is no inherent conflict between high labour and environmental standards in 
the domestic economy and success in the global economy. In fact, the evidence 
points strongly to a positive correlation between high standards, high national 
incomes, and economic openness. Nations that have opened themselves to the 
global economy tend to grow faster, achieve higher capita incomes, and maintain 
higher labour and environmental standards. The belief that higher standards can be 
promoted only through tough language in trade agreements is built on a myth.
76
 
 
The past half century has been marked by an unprecedented expansion of international 
trade. In terms of volume, trade is nearly 32 times greater than it was in 1950.77 By way of 
comparison, the level of gross domestic product (GDP) worldwide has increased by little 
more than eight times during the same period. A number of reasons have been given to 
explain the enormous expansion in world trade. Foremost among these reasons is 
technological change, which has dramatically reduced the cost of transportation and 
communications.78 A second reason for the expansion in trade is the spread of more open 
trade and investment policies. Many countries have liberalised their trade regimes through 
unilateral changes in their national policies, through bilateral or regional trade 
arrangements, or through multilateral trade negotiations.79 
 
In addressing how the opening up of trade has affected GHG emissions, trade economists 
have developed a conceptual framework to examine how trade opening up may affect the 
                                                          
74
 Copeland BR & Taylor MS (2004)7. 
75
Feris L ‘Trade and the environment’ in Strydom HA & King ND (eds) Environmental Management in South 
Africa 2ed (2009) 269. 
76
 Griswold DT ‘Trade, labor, and the environment: How blue and green sanctions threaten high standards’ 
(2001) 10 available at http://www.cato.org/pubs/tpa/tpa-015b.pdf (accessed 14 March 2011). 
77
WTO-UNEP Report (2009) 48. 
78
WTO-UNEP Report (2009) 48. 
79
WTO-UNEP Report (2009) 48.The impact of trade and trade liberalisation on climate change is unambiguous; 
this is based on the fact that increase trade and production undoubtedly lead to increased carbon dioxide 
emissions. 
 
 
 
 
21 
 
environment, and this framework serves well in identifying the sorts of impacts that trade 
policies might have with respect to climate change.80 This research work considers four 
types of effect and they are described below. 
 
2.4.1 Scale effect 
 
Copeland and Taylor define the scale effect as the increase in the value of production, 
measured in world prices as they were prior to trade opening up.81 In other words, if there 
are unemployed resources (labour, capital or land) prior to liberalisation, trade opening will 
allow greater utilisation of these resources and will thus lead to an expansion in the level of 
production.82 The scale effect will, in itself, have negative climate change impacts; the more 
goods produced, the more GHGs emitted. 83 
 
The scale effect is conceptually different from economic growth, since the latter is a result 
of capital accumulation, population growth and technological change. Nevertheless, there is 
a presumption that, in theory, greater trade opening will lead to economic growth in 
productivity. Given that economic growth is closely linked to energy use, this will magnify 
the impact on GHG emissions.84 
2.4.2  Composition effect 
 
This refers to the way that trade opening up causes changes in relative prices and this changes the 
share that each sector represents in a country’s production, resulting in the expansion of some 
sectors and the contraction of others. The consequent increase or decrease of GHG emissions 
will depend on whether the emission-intensive sectors are expanding or contracting. 
Changes in the structure of a liberalising country’s production will depend on where the 
country’s ‘comparative advantage’ (in terms of resources and capacity) lies: if its 
comparative advantage is in sectors which are less emission-intensive, then trade opening 
up will lead to lower GHG emissions, but if it is in the more emission-intensive sectors, then 
                                                          
80
Cosbey A ‘Trade and Climate Change Linkages’ Scoping paper (2007) 3 available at 
http://www.iisd.org/pdf/2007/trade_climate_linkages.pdf (accessed 15 January 2011). 
81
 See generally Copeland BR & Taylor MS (2004). 
82
 See generally Copeland BR & Taylor MS (2004). 
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Cosbey A (2007) 3. 
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WTO-UNEP Report (2009) 50-1. 
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liberalisation will lead to greater emissions of GHGs.85As a result, some economies will 
become more GHG-intensive overall, and some may become less so. From a global 
perspective this does not necessarily mean that GHG emissions are unchanged. As global 
income levels increase, the global economy will change to favour those goods that are 
relatively ‘luxurious’. This may be good from a climate change perspective (consumers can 
afford more solar panels) or bad (consumers can afford more automobiles).86 
2.4.3 Technique effect 
 
This refers to improvements in the methods by which goods and services are produced, so 
that the quantity of emissions released during the production process declines.87 According 
to Grossman and Krueger, this reduction in GHG emissions may come about in two ways.88 
First, more open trade will increase the availability and lower the cost of climate-friendly 
goods and services. This is particularly important for countries which do not have access to 
climate-friendly goods and services, or whose domestic industries do not produce such 
goods and services in sufficient amounts or at affordable prices. Secondly, the increase in 
income levels that trade opening brings about can lead the general public to demand lower 
GHG emissions (a cleaner environment is a ‘normal’ good). Increased incomes or wealth give 
populations the freedom to be concerned about other aspects of their well-being, including 
better environmental quality.89 
2.4.4 Direct effect 
 
The very fact of increased trade, in and of itself, will lead directly to more global GHG 
emissions from the increased transport of goods. The GHG-intensity of transport varies 
enormously from marine transport to trucks to air freight, but in the end all modes of 
transport will have some emissions.90 
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WTO-UNEP Report (2009) 50-1. 
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Cosbey A (2007) 3. 
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WTO-UNEP Report (2009) 50-1. 
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 Grossman GM & Krueger AB ‘Environmental Impacts of a North  American Free Trade Agreement’ in Garber 
PM (ed) The US Mexico Free Trade Agreement (1993) 13-56. 
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In light of the above linkages, the pertinent question to ask is whether BCA measures fit into 
the trade and climate change linkage? Given that different economies might have different 
emission targets in the absence of an international agreement on climate change, unilateral 
border measures such as BCAs aim to provide market signals which lead to the countries 
that have less stringent standards adopting standards similar to those in countries where 
stricter measures are implemented. The objective, of course, is to counter both the GHGs 
leakage effect and the loss of competitiveness of domestic commodities.91 The danger, of 
course, is that these measures could end up being non-tariff barriers or subtle attempts at 
protectionism. These measures basically aim to interact with the technique and composition 
effects of trade on climate change.92 By forcing the exporting countries to adopt stronger 
emissions norms, the proposed outcome is that the technique of production will end up 
being cleaner or more environmentally-friendly. Alternatively, as a result of these measures 
the composition of production might change in favour of environmentally-friendly goods 
and services. But the fundamental question is whether this is, in fact, the objective behind 
the proposed imposition of BCAs and whether they will actually lower GHG emissions.93 
 
Furthermore, the linkages between climate change and trade can also be looked at from the 
perspective of the policies put in place. Although the trade and climate regimes have 
different aims and organisation, they do in fact enjoy many common features. Both regimes 
aim to promote greater economic efficiency in order to enhance public welfare.94 Both 
regimes recognise linkages between the economy and the environment. Both look to the 
future and advocate actions that, while bringing about short-term adjustment costs, 
anticipate long-term benefits. Both regimes are worried about free riders and devote 
considerable attention to securing compliance. Both regimes are deferential to the volitions 
of developing countries, and follow principles of ‘special and differential treatment’ or 
‘common but differentiated responsibilities.’ Lastly, both regimes are dynamic works-in-
progress, continuing institutional improvements during successive negotiations.95 
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The climate policy focuses on protection (it protects the climate system from negative 
anthropogenic impacts), whereas the international trade policy promotes liberalisation (it 
seeks to provide free access of goods and services to a global market).96 
 
The linkages can also be considered with regard to the impact of climate change on trade.97 
At a practical level, climate change is expected to affect production of various commodities, 
which is the basis of international trade in those commodities.98 The impact on international 
trade might be negative, considering the fact that production of an existing export may no 
longer be possible due to the changed climate. It could also be positive if the change in 
production makes it possible to produce new crops or expand production of existing ones. 
On the other hand, international trade itself can affect climate change indirectly through 
transportation.  International trade can also be a conduit for the transfer of clean 
technology, which is why there has been a push in the WTO for liberalisation of trade in 
environmentally-friendly goods and services.99 
 
Another aspect of the linkages can be examined from a legal point of view. The WTO has a 
dispute settlement system whose function is to settle disputes between members. It is 
reasonable to expect that domestic mitigation measures such as BCAs that may violate the 
rights of other members under the WTO are likely to be scrutinised for their consistency 
with the WTO.100 Finally, in international law there is no hierarchy between the 
international trade and climate regimes. Both sets of rules have equal status under 
international law, notwithstanding that they were adopted in different forums.101 
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2.5 The impact of climate change on trade in Africa 
 
Compared to other regions in the world, Africa’s contribution to GHG emissions is low – 
about 3.5 per cent of the global total.102  Nonetheless, evidence suggests that Africa as a 
region is one of the most vulnerable to the impacts of climate change, and this is 
compounded by the far greater exposure of the region to climatic variation.103In its Fourth 
Assessment Report, the IPCC notes that it is projected that by 2020 between 75 and 250 
million people will be exposed to water stress due to climate change and that in some 
African countries yields from rain-fed agriculture could be reduced by up to 50 per cent, 
thereby compromising access to food and exacerbating malnutrition. These severe impacts 
will inevitably worsen existing vulnerabilities of the African region, which are largely caused 
by its high dependence on agriculture and natural resources and by the high prevalence of 
poverty on the continent.104 
However, Africa is an enormous landmass, stretching from about 350N to 350S, and the 
climatic effects are very different according to location within the continent: there is no 
Africa-wide climate effect. Some regions in Africa will become drier, others wetter, and 
some regions may derive economic benefit, while most will be adversely affected.105 Early 
research has, however, indicated that the most significant climate change that has occurred 
in Africa is a long-term reduction of rainfall in the semi-arid regions of West Africa in 
particular.106 
 
What then are the implications of climate change on trade in Africa, in particular key sectors 
that constitute the backbone of African trade, such as agriculture, fishing and tourism?  
 
The agriculture sector is a major contributor to the current economy of most African 
countries, providing about 60 per cent of employment across the continent and, in some 
                                                          
102
Biacuana G ‘Climate change: Case study of Mozambique’ in Drapers P &Mbirimi I (eds) Climate Change & 
Trade: The Challenges for Southern Africa (2010) 182. 
103
 Collier P, Conway G & Venables T ‘Climate change and Africa’ (2008) available at 
http://users.ox.ac.uk/econpo/research/pdfsClimateChangeand Africa.pdf (accessed 16 February 2011).  
104
Mbirimi I (2010) 246. 
105
 Collier P Conway G &Venables T (2008) 3. 
106
 Feris L ‘Multilateral trade policies and measures in post-Kyoto structures’ in Drapers P & Mbirimi I (eds) 
Climate Change & Trade:The Challenges for Southern Africa (2010) 98. 
 
 
 
 
26 
 
countries, more than 50 percent of GDP.107However, higher temperatures will directly 
change crop yields. The areas suitable for agriculture; the length of growing seasons; and 
the yield potential, particularly along the margins of semi-arid and arid areas, are all 
expected to decrease. Many crops in Africa are already grown close to their limits of thermal 
tolerance. Extreme weather is likely to become more frequent with global warming, creating 
high annual variability in crop production. More prolonged high temperatures and periods 
of drought will force large regions of marginal agriculture out of production. The maize crop 
over most of southern Africa already experiences drought stress on an annual basis. This is 
likely to worsen with climate change and extend further southwards, perhaps making maize 
production in many parts of Zimbabwe and South Africa very difficult, if not impossible.108 
 
Changes in agricultural productivity will exacerbate food security challenges already facing 
most Africa countries.109 According to the IPCCC report, agricultural prices are expected to 
increase by up to 20 per cent in the short and medium term. Although it is difficult to 
pinpoint exactly how much climate change is contributing to this challenge, by 2080 about 
768 million people are likely to be malnourished. Sub-Sahara Africa is likely to surpass Asia 
as the most food insecure region, mostly because of the socioeconomic developments for 
the different developing regions, but also in part due to climate impacts.110 
 
While agriculture forms the backbone of international trade in Africa, the fishing industry 
plays an equally important role. The industry is already under severe pressure as a result of 
over fishing. The effect of climate change will put this industry under further pressure and 
will further impact on food security in the region, as fish make up a significant part of the 
food supply in Africa.111 Changes in climatic conditions, such as air temperature and 
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precipitation, affect fisheries by altering habitat availability or quality, and fisheries’ habitats 
may be affected by: changes in water temperature; the timing and duration of extreme 
temperature conditions; the magnitude and pattern of annual stream flows; surface water 
elevations; and the changing shorelines of lakes, reservoirs and near-shore marine 
environments.112 
 
Apart from the agriculture and fishing sectors, climate change is also said to have potential 
impacts for the tourism sector.113 This sector is one of Africa’s fastest-growing industries 
and is conservation-based, and as such relies on wildlife and water supplies to survive and 
grow.114 However, recurrent droughts in the past decade have depleted wildlife resources 
significantly, and climate change may increase the frequency of flooding, drought and land 
degradation, reducing the viability of recreation activities and wildlife safaris. The 
permanent loss of such attractions would have a significant impact on investment in 
tourism. Various indirect impacts may also result from changes in landscape. For instance, 
the ‘capital’ of tourism might be affected, leading potential tourists to perceive Africa as less 
attractive and consequently to seek new locations elsewhere.115 Africa may also face a 
decline in the sector as a result of changes in weather patterns, which to a very large extent 
will deprive countries of their natural assets.  
 
Furthermore, the impacts of climate change will also be felt in the energy sector, primarily 
through losses or changes in hydropower potential for electricity generation and the effects 
of increased runoff (and consequent siltation) on hydrogenation, and also through changes 
in the growth rates of trees used for fuel wood. Millions of cubic metres of biomass 
dependence for the African energy sector are high. This dependence becomes critical, as the 
source of biomass is derived from the natural regeneration of indigenous natural forests.116 
Finally, Africa’s reliance on agriculture and fishing is likely to impact on the comparative 
advantage of countries within the region, setting up the possibility of changes in trade flows 
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as producers respond to the changing opportunities.117 On the flipside, it is argued that 
warming may bring about higher agricultural yields in certain regions.118  Additional negative 
trade impacts stem from the possible disruption of trade-related infrastructure, especially 
coastal infrastructure, such as ports, and distribution of facilities, resulting from extreme 
weather events, such as, hurricanes and floods. Transportation of bulk freight by inland 
waterways, such as the Nile, could be disrupted during droughts. Disruptions to the supply, 
transport and distribution chains would raise the costs of undertaking international trade. 
While an increase in trade costs would be bad for trade generally, many developing African 
countries, whose integration into the global economy has depended on their participation in 
international production chains, may be more vulnerable than developed countries.119 
 
2.6 Conclusion 
 
It is evident from the above discussion that climate change is a major challenge that needs 
to be addressed globally.120 The impacts will affect key sectors of international trade, such 
as agriculture, tourism, trade infrastructure and routes. It is also evident that African 
countries are more vulnerable to the impact of climate change than is the developed world. 
While African countries have a responsibility to address the threats posed by climate 
change, it is also pertinent to note that they are less culpable and their responsibility will 
differ accordingly from that of the developed countries. In light of this, the UN Secretary-
General, Ban Ki-moon noted that: 
The issue of equity is crucial. Climate change affects all, but it does not affect us all equally. Those 
who have done the least to cause the problem bear the gravest consequences. We have an ethical 
obligation to right this injustice. We have a duty to protect the most vulnerable. That is why any 
agreement should look to developed countries to continue taking the lead on curbing emissions. And 
developing nations need to be given incentives to limit the growth of their emissions. Together, we 
can spur a new era of green economics, an era of truly sustainable development based on clean 
technology and a low emission economy. But we must also take action on the immediate challenges. 
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It is crucial that we follow through on existing commitments and ensure the resilience of populations 
that are or will be the hardest hit by climate change impacts.
121
 
 
One of the ways to address these challenges is for developed countries to impose trade-
related measures such as BCAs. The problem with these measures is that they may face 
some constraint under the WTO rules. Thus it is crucial that these measures be reconciled 
with the WTO rules. Having considered the linkages of climate change to international trade, 
it is important to examine the legality of BCA measures under the GATT rules. 
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CHAPTER THREE 
 
 
                           Legal analysis of border carbon adjustments 
 
3.1 Introduction 
 
As governments in the developed world start advocating the need for the inclusion of a 
carbon price into industrial activities subject to international competition, they are also 
increasingly aware of possible repercussions on industrial competitiveness and on the risk of 
carbon leakage (i.e. the relocation of greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions to the non-carbon 
constrained region).122 In a quest to address these challenges, some countries are proposing 
to put in place several types of unilateral measures.123 One of such unilateral measure is the 
implementation of border carbon adjustments (BCAs) measures, whereby a carbon price is 
adjusted at the border for international products. However, trade comes into play when 
such unilateral measures are being adopted; at the moment, unilateral measures are 
probably the most controversial topic in the debate on trade and climate change.124 
 
The adoption of these unilateral measures raises the question of whether they are 
permissible under the legal framework of the multilateral trading system, considering that 
World Trade Organisation (WTO) members are not allowed to adopt unilateral measures 
which will otherwise serve as a disguised restriction on international trade.  
 
This chapter seeks to examine the compatibility of BCA measures with WTO law. In pursuing 
this objective, this chapter examines, first, the question of whether BCAs can be covered by 
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the GATT rules on border tax adjustment (BTA). Secondly, this chapter provides a legal 
analysis building on previous ‘trade and environment’ cases brought before the WTO 
adjudicative bodies. This examines whether, and under which conditions, such measures 
would likely be considered consistent with WTO law in light of the obligations of 
international trade law. 
 
As a starting point, it is important to note that WTO case law does not formally benefit from 
the principle of stare decisis, and therefore is neither binding nor precedent-setting in a 
strictly legal sense. However, as a practical matter the WTO adjudicative bodies have relied 
upon previous decisions with a consistency that gives them a high degree of legal authority. 
This general trend has been reinforced by the establishment of the Appellate Body (AB) as 
the last resort under the WTO adjudicative system.125 
3.2 Definition of BTA and its applicability to carbon taxes 
 
The issue of BTA has a rather long history, dating back to the Havana Charter.126 On 28 
March 1968, the council established a working party to examine: first, the provisions of the 
GATT relevant to BTA; secondly, the practices of contracting parties; and thirdly, the 
possible effects of BTA on international trade.127 It was mandated to consider proposals and 
suggestions based on this examination and to report to the council or the contracting 
parties. The working party members agreed that BTA mainly concerned Articles II and III of 
the GATT on the import side, and Article XVI of the GATT on the export side.128 The working 
party used the definition of BTA applied by the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and 
Development (OECD). Thus, BTAs were regarded as: 
[A]ny fiscal measures which put into effect, in whole or in part, the destination 
principle (i.e. which enable exported products to be relieved of some or all of the 
tax charged in the exporting country in respect of similar domestic products sold to 
consumers on the home market and which enable imported products sold to 
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consumers to be charged with some or all of the tax charged in the importing 
country in respect of similar domestic products.129 
 
In other words, the right to impose a domestic tax on imports is referred to as ‘border tax 
adjustment’, while the opposite of the right to impose a domestic tax on imports is the right 
to rebate the same tax on domestic products that get exported. Under the WTO rules such 
exports are not considered to be prohibited export subsidies.130 
 
Further, the line between (generally prohibited) border tariffs and (generally permitted) 
domestic taxes is set out in Article II: 2 (a) of the GATT. This provision provides that the 
GATT’s strict rules on maximum tariff ceilings do not prevent a country: 
*F+rom imposing at any time on the importation of any product…a charge equivalent 
to an internal tax…in respect of the like domestic product or in respect of an article 
from which the imported product has been manufactured or produced in whole or 
in part.[own emphasis added]. 
 
This Article allows WTO members to impose two types of BTAs: (i) charges imposed on 
imported products that are like domestic products, and (ii) charges imposed on articles from 
which the imported product has been manufactured or produced in whole or in part. 
Therefore, WTO members are allowed at any time to impose on the importation of any 
product a charge equivalent to an internal tax (e.g. BTA).  
 
Suffice to state that there is a difference between a ‘border tax’ and a ‘border tax 
adjustment’. A border tax is a tax (or customs duty) imposed on imported goods, while a 
BTA is an adjustment of the taxes imposed domestically on products when the goods are 
imported. This also applies to export duties and export rebates respectively.131 
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However, it is well established under GATT law that only indirect taxes may be adjusted at 
the border. Indirect taxes are taxes that can be passed on to the consumers.132 The 
distinction between indirect taxes and direct taxes was originally based on economic theory 
regarding the extent to which such taxes were passed forward into commodity prices. The 
burden of indirect taxes was thought to be passed through to consumers, while the burden 
of direct taxes was thought to be borne by the producer.133  The reason behind this 
distinction between, on the one hand, adjustable product or indirect taxes and, on the other 
hand, non-adjustable producer or direct taxes is the so called ‘destination principle’, 
according to which products themselves should only be taxed in the country of consumption 
(in other words: exports get a rebate; imports get taxed).134 In this view, if products are only 
taxed in their place of consumption, countries preserve the right to choose their own level 
of taxation and trade neutrality is maintained, as all products in a given market compete on 
the same competitive terms (without either double taxation or advantages from  a more 
favourable tax regime in their country of origin).135 The distinction also finds some support 
in the economic theory that product taxes are shifted forward into consumer prices, 
whereas producer taxes (such as taxes on profits) are not passed on to the price of a 
product.136 
 
What then is a carbon tax? A carbon tax is a tax levied against products that emit carbon 
during the production process. The idea is to penalise the producers of such products and 
create incentives for the production of carbon-free goods. These taxes are often 
accompanied by BTAs on imported goods.137 This is what is now referred to as BCA 
measures (BTA + carbon taxes) in the context of climate policy. 
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The question that now arises is what are BCAs? Nielsen defined BCAs as border taxies levied 
on especially carbon-intensive products, such as steel, aluminum, paper, chemicals and 
cement originating from countries that have not committed themselves to strict climate 
change laws to lower their GHG emissions.138 These countries are most often understood as 
those that have not committed themselves to a cap in a post-Kyoto agreement.139McIsaac 
defines BCAs to include BTAs on products and carbon allowances for domestic firms.140BCAs 
can take two forms: carbon tax and a mandatory requirement for importers to hold 
emissions allowances. The more ambitious is the carbon tax, which adjusts the charges on 
imports according to the level of GHG emitted during the production of each specific 
imported product. In the case of the second form of BCAs, the importing country sets a 
standardized tariff, or a number of emission allowances required for each product category 
under the BCAs to be paid when importing, regardless of how ‘green’ its production process 
has been. These standardised charges for imported products can either be based on the 
carbon content of domestic production or based on the carbon content embodied in 
imports.141 
 
Further, the overall economic rationale behind BCAs is to address competitiveness concerns 
and level the playing field between domestic and foreign produced products.142 Concerns 
among domestic industries, especially those involved in energy-intensive production 
activities, often are directed towards a loss of competitiveness, fearing that imports of 
similar products that do not face higher energy prices due to carbon policy will gain an 
advantage over domestically produced goods.143 The environmental rationale is to avoid 
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‘carbon leakage’.144 This term refers to a situation in which the measures taken by some 
countries to limit their carbon dioxide (CO2) emissions at a national level do not ultimately 
result in a global CO2 reduction, because industries emitting high levels of CO2 simply 
relocate to countries which do not impose such strong penalties on emissions.145 It has been 
argued that the specific economic and environmental effectiveness of BCAs depends on 
their exact design, but a review of studies published to date suggests that while BCAs may 
be effective in addressing the economic competitiveness concern, their environmentally 
relevant impact on reducing leakage is less clear and may be modest.146Another rationale 
for the imposition of BCAs is to get countries without emissions reduction commitments to 
make such commitments or to encourage those countries outside the framework of Kyoto 
Protocol to join it.147 
3.3  Could a carbon tax be regarded as an adjustable product tax (=indirect tax) or 
would it be classified as a producer tax (= direct tax)? 
 
Pauwelyn148 argues that it is reasonable to classify a carbon tax as a product tax. He says the 
idea of the carbon tax is to internalise the social cost of carbon in the ultimate price of 
products so as to give an incentive to both producers and consumers to limit the use of 
carbon-intensive products and to shift to greener energy. From that perspective, a carbon 
tax is an indirect tax applied ‘indirectly’ to products. As the very reason for the tax is to 
make carbon-intensive products more expensive, the tax does (or should) shift forward to 
consumers and therefore could be said to be adjustable at the border. According to 
Mavroidis, it would be unlikely that a panel would classify a carbon tax as a producer tax 
adjustable at the border.149 
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3.4 The adjustment of non physical input at the border 
 
This raises the question as to whether taxes on inputs which are not physically incorporated 
into the final product can be adjusted at the border? 
 
This issue is quite complex and various scholars have expressed various opinions. 
Pauwelyn150 admits that it remains unclear whether a tax on inputs which are not physically 
incorporated into the final product can be adjusted at the border. The reason is that these 
‘hidden taxes’ target not the physical features of the imported product itself, but rather the 
process or production method of the product abroad. In the US–Superfund dispute, the 
panel permitted the United States to impose a domestic tax on certain imports that had 
used the same chemicals ‘as materials in the manufacture or production’ of these imports. 
Importantly, the panel did not specify whether these chemicals still had to be physically 
present in the imported product.151Holzer admits that the legal status of non-product 
related PPMs is not clear, arguing that the problem is that these measures are applied 
extraterritorially, i.e. an importing country imposes on an exporting country its 
environmental policy as well as its production methods on foreign producers.152Howse and 
Eliason153 disagree with Pauwelyn, arguing that the definition in the Agreement on Subsidies 
and Countervailing Measures (SCM Agreement)154 makes it clear that the relevant concept is 
whether inputs are used to create the final product, not whether they are physically 
embodied in it. Therefore, the language in Article II: 2 (a) of the GATT, namely ‘from which 
the imported product has been manufactured or produced in whole or in part’, should be 
read to include not only products incorporated physically into the imported final product 
but also that are necessary to its manufacture or production. They therefore estimate 
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Article II: 2 of the GATT to be applicable.155 Other scholars argue that the revision in the 
Uruguay Round broadened the category of adjustable taxes to allow rebates for indirect 
taxes on goods and services if they were ‘consumed’ in the production of the exported 
product. They point out the differences between the 1979 SCM Code and the 1994 SCM 
Agreement which slightly changed the impetus behind these provisions.156 
 
However, Veel argued that while the charges on CO2 emissions do not obviously fall into the 
types of direct taxes listed in paragraph 14 of the Working Party Report, they would most 
likely be characterised as ‘taxes occultes’, i.e. consumption taxes on capital equipment, 
auxiliary materials and services used in the transportation and production of taxable goods. 
He further argued that flowing from the GATT panel decision in the US-Superfund dispute 
where it was held that the tax on the imported substance was eligible for BTAs. This 
decision suggests that taxes applied to imported products based on the quantity of the 
intermediate products used in the production of the imported product are in principle 
eligible for BTAs. Thus, the same reasoning might also suggest that charges based on the 
amount of CO2 emitted in the production of a good might also be eligible for BTAs.
157  
Finally, even if the rules on BTAs can be applied, a carbon tax must not discriminate 
between domestic and foreign producers as provided for under Article III: 2 of the GATT. 
 
3.5 Compliance with Article III: 2 of GATT 
 
Article III: 2 provides as follows: 
The products of the territory of any contracting party imported into the territory of any other 
contracting party shall not be subject, directly or indirectly, to internal taxes or other internal 
charges of any kind in excess of those applied, directly or indirectly, to like domestic 
products. Moreover, no contracting party shall otherwise apply internal taxes or other 
internal charges to imported or domestic products in a manner contrary to the principles set 
forth in paragraph 1. 
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The provision of Article III: 2 contains the national treatment principle, which requires 
member states to treat imported products no less favourably than like domestic 
products.158 This Article deals specifically with internal taxes or other internal charges. For a 
tax on imports to fall under this provision, it needs to apply ‘directly or indirectly, to like 
domestic products’.159 
 
However, in analysing the provision of Article III: 2, the Appellate Body (AB) has noted that 
this Article contains two separate sentences, each imposing distinct obligations: the first lays 
down obligations in respect of ‘like products’, while the second lays down obligations in 
respect of ‘directly competitive or substitutable’ products.160 It has also been noted by the 
AB that the two separate obligations in the two sentences of Article III: 2 must be 
interpreted in a harmonious manner that gives meaning to both sentences in that provision. 
Thus, the scope of the term ‘like products’ in the first sentence of Article III: 2 affects, and is 
affected by, the scope of the phrase ‘directly competitive or substitutable’ products in the 
second sentence of that provision.161 
 
3.5.1 In terms of Article III: 2 first sentence 
 
The first sentence raises the issue of what constitutes ‘like product’ under the GATT/WTO 
law. The like test is well founded in WTO/GATT jurisprudence, and it has been held by the 
AB that the term ‘likeness’ must be decided on a case-by-case basis. In the Japan–Alcoholic 
Beverages II case, the AB listed four criteria to determine ‘like’ products: (1) the physical 
characteristics of the products; (2) the end use of the product in a given market; (3) 
consumers’ tastes and habits; and (4) tariff classification.162 The source of the first three 
criteria is the Working Party Report on Border Tax Adjustments, while the fourth criterion 
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was subsequently added by the GATT panel in US–Gasoline163. Further, the AB has made it 
clear that the concept of likeness is one that needs to be addressed on a case-by-case basis: 
the four criteria are simply tools to assist in the task of sorting and examining the relevant 
evidence, and not a closed list of criteria that determine the legal characteristics of 
products.164 This will allow a fair assessment in each case of the different elements that 
constitute ‘similar product’. The AB put it accordingly as follows: 
No one approach to exercising judgment will be appropriate for all cases. The concept of ‘likeness’ is a 
relative one that evokes the image of an accordion. The accordion of ‘likeness’ stretches and squeezes 
in different places as different provisions of the WTO agreement are applied. The width of the 
accordion in any one of those places must be determined by the particular provision in which the 
term ‘like’ is encountered as well as by the context and the circumstances that prevail in any given 
case to which that provision may apply.
165
 
 
In interpreting the first sentence of Article III: 2, the AB noted that in determining what 
constitutes like product that this must be construed narrowly, so as not to condemn 
measures that in strict terms are not meant to be condemned.166 
 
Furthermore, the analyses of finding ‘like products’ in relation to BCAs can be viewed from 
two perspectives: (1) the imported and domestic products to be compared must be 
identified; (2) whether the imported and domestic products can be considered ‘like 
products’ notwithstanding differences in the taxes or energy (or carbon) that may be 
‘embodied’ in the final product.167 To use Veel’s example, a carbon tax would result in a tax 
on imported ‘high CO2 steel’ which is in excess of domestically-produced low CO2 steel. Thus, 
the question is whether high CO2steel is ‘like’ low CO2 steel.
168 Originally, the SCM 
Agreement permitted border adjustments on inputs to production only when the goods 
were ‘physically incorporated’ into the exported products. The Uruguay Round brought a 
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change to permitted adjustable taxes and extended export rebates to indirect taxes on 
goods if they are ‘consumed’ in the production of the exported product.169 
 
Different scholars have shared different views on the test of ‘likeness’ as it relates to BCAs. 
Pauwelyn argues that all of the factors except, potentially, for consumers’ tastes and habits, 
suggest that high CO2 and low CO2 steel are like products under Article III: 2.
170Veel argues 
that a product’s ‘properties, nature and quality’ include the degree of the CO2 emitted in the 
course of the production of those products. However, practical considerations might lead a 
WTO panel considering this factor to conclude that high CO2 steel is ‘like’ low CO2 steel. Even 
accepting the notion that differences in the production and process methods used in 
producing two otherwise like products can in some cases lead to a finding that the products 
are not in fact like under Article III: 2, the fact that CO2 emissions are a continuous variable 
complicates the determination of likeness.171 Bhagwati and Mavroidis are of the view that a 
reasonable consumer test- underlying an ‘informed consumer’ would probably lead to the 
conclusion that a consumer who is aware of the environmental hazard that global warming 
might represent will treat the two goods (Kyoto compatible and Kyoto incompatible) as 
unlike goods. However, this seems valid only for the case where the process had been 
‘Incorporated in the final product’. Others have argued that the criterion ‘consumer tastes 
and habits’ cannot be stretched so far as to render physically identical products ‘unlike’.172 
 
Another requirement under the first sentence of Article III: 2 is whether the taxes on 
imported products are ‘in excess of’ those on like domestic products. If so, then the WTO 
member that has imposed the tax is not in compliance with Article III. Even the smallest 
amount of ‘excess’ is too much.173The AB has, however, stated that the prohibition of 
discriminatory taxes in Article III: 2, first sentence, is not conditional on a ‘trade effects test’ 
and nor is it qualified by a de minimis standard.174 
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Finally, the issue of determining what constitutes likeness in relation to BCAs raises the 
question of how to determine the carbon content of specific imports without discriminating 
against imports? It has been suggested that in order to avoid any semblance of 
discrimination, the calculation of the carbon tax or emission allowance requirement on 
imports based on the carbon emitted should be done using the best available technology. 
This to a very large extent will reduce the amount of adjustment that can be imposed on 
imports and may not be sufficient to address competitiveness concerns, but will avoid 
claims of discrimination as all ‘like’ products will then be taxed the same.175 
 
3.5.2  In terms of Article III: 2 second sentence 
 
The main element under the second sentence of Article III: 2 is that internal taxes and other 
internal charges ‘should not be applied to imported or domestic products so as to afford 
protection to domestic production’. However, in interpreting the second sentence of Article 
III: 2, the AB has noted that this must be read together with the Added Article (Ad). The Ad  
Article states as follows: 
A tax conforming to the requirements of the first sentence of paragraph 2 would be 
considered to be inconsistent with the provisions of the second sentence only in cases where 
competition was involved between, on the one hand, the taxed product and, on the other 
hand, a directly competitive or substitutable product which was not similarly taxed. [own 
emphasis added] 
 
Suffice to state that Article III: 2, second sentence, and the accompanying Ad Article have 
equivalent legal status in the sense that both are treaty language which was negotiated and 
agreed at the same time. The Ad Article does not replace or modify the language contained 
in Article III: 2, second sentence, but, in fact, clarifies its meaning.176 Accordingly, the 
language of the second sentence and the Ad Article must be read together in order to give 
them their proper meaning.177 Further, in determining whether imported products are 
treated in a less favourable manner than domestic products, the panel in the US–Gasoline 
                                                          
175
Pauwelyn J (2007) 31. 
176
 AB Report  Japan–Alcoholic Beverages II p. 24. 
177
 AB Report  Japan–Alcoholic Beverages II p. 24. 
 
 
 
 
42 
 
case178 found that imported and domestic gasoline were ‘like products’ and that since, 
under the baseline establishment gasoline rules, imported gasoline was effectively 
prevented from benefitting from as favourable sales conditions as were afforded domestic 
gasoline by an individual baseline tied to the producer of a product, imported gasoline was 
treated ‘less favourably’ than domestic gasoline. Thus, the gasoline rules were accordingly 
inconsistent with Article III. 
 
3.6  Compliance with Article I of the GATT (MFN) 
 
The imposition of BCAs must not only avoid discrimination of imports against domestic 
products (national treatment under GATT Article III), it must also avoid discrimination 
between imports from different countries. Thus, any advantage granted by any member to 
any product originating in or destined for any other country must be shared evenhandedly 
to the like products of all member countries. This is the requirement under the so called 
‘most favoured nation’ (MFN) obligation of GATT Article I. This provision requires, more 
specifically, that: 
[A]ny advantage…granted by any member to any product originating in…any other country 
shall be accorded immediately and unconditionally to the like product originating in…all 
other WTO members.179 [own emphasis added]. 
 
Following the above quotation, at least three problems may arise from the implementation 
of BCAs. First, if any of the proposed legislation on BCAs excludes from its scope imports 
from countries that have emission cuts in place. In that case an ‘advantage’ will be granted 
to such countries above other countries that don’t have emission cuts in place. For example, 
if the United States (US) grants an advantage to the European Union (EU) (which is subject 
to emission cuts in Europe) and it doesn’t grant the same ‘advantage’ ‘immediately and 
unconditionally’ to a country like China and India (who do not have emission cuts in place), 
this will no doubt be a violation of Article I of the GATT because products from the EU 
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market will have more ‘advantage’ over and above products coming from China and India in 
the international market. 180 
 
Secondly, another issue that may arise is if BCAs are imposed across the board, including 
imports from countries that have their own emission cuts in place. This will bring about a 
situation where countries who have similar regulations will be taxed twice and at the same 
time goods from countries which don’t have an emission limit in place will have an 
advantage above others. For example, if the US imposes BCAs on goods emanating from the 
EU and China, Europe could then challenge such legislation, arguing that its producers are 
paying the price of carbon twice: once under domestic EU legislation and a second time at 
US customs. From that perspective, Chinese imports, for example, are granted an 
‘advantage’ (i.e. only taxed once) not accorded to European imports. However, such 
advantage can be neutralised by rebating any tax or costs borne by European products upon 
exportation. That is, after all, the other side of BTAs: European goods get a rebate upon 
exportation but, according to the destination principle, pay the US carbon tax when 
imported into the US.181 
 
A third form of discrimination arising from Article I: I is the exemption of importers of goods 
from those countries identified by the UN as Least Developed Countries (LDCs) from the 
imposition of BCAs.182 This may, however, be justified under the enabling clause, which 
permits developed countries to offer ‘differential and more favourable treatment to 
developing countries, without according such treatment to other WTO members’.183 
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According to the AB, the enabling clause does not authorize any kind of response to any 
claimed need of developing countries, but rather the types of needs to which response is 
envisaged are limited to ‘development, financial and trade needs’.184 In providing additional 
guidance on what standards might be permissible bases for such ‘need’, the AB indicated 
that broad-based recognition of a particular ‘need’, set out in multilateral instruments 
adopted by international organisations, could serve as such a standard.185  If LDCs are 
exempted from the imposition of BCAs this will certainly meet the standard, as LDCs are 
determined by the UN, which is an international organisation saddled with the responsibility 
to identify the poorest and most vulnerable developing countries. Thus, the exemption of 
LDCs from the imposition of BCAs would most likely not violate Article I of the GATT.  
 
Likewise, it will be a breach of Article I of GATT to exclude developing countries depending 
on their stage of economic development. This stands, however, in contrast to Article 3: I of 
the UNFCCC which provides that any measure must comply with the principle of common 
but differentiated responsibilities and capabilities.186 This principle provides for different 
treatment of developing countries based on special needs and circumstances, future 
economic development and historical contributions to causing global warming.187 
3.7 Justification under Article XX of the GATT 
 
The environmental exception found in GATT Article XX provides justifications for border 
measures that may otherwise violate the GATT provision.188 In the US–Shrimp case, the AB 
emphasised that each of the exceptions in Article XX is a ‘limited and conditional’ exception 
from the substantive obligations contained in the provisions of GATT 1994.189 On the one 
hand, the list of exceptions under Article XX is exhaustive: no other public policy objectives 
except those listed in the clauses of the Article can serve as excuses for the violation of 
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substantive rules. On the other hand, invocation of Article XX requires fulfilling a number of 
requirements.190 Further, it is important to note that the provisions of GATT Article XX 
cannot be invoked to justify a measure to offset competitive disadvantages for domestic 
industry as Article XX does not cater for economic arguments.191 
 
However, the position is really not clear as to whether Article XX could be invoked if BCAs 
legislation violates provisions outside the GATT, e.g. the SCM Agreement, in the case of 
allowances rebates. When a violation concerns provisions of other agreements contained in 
Annex 1A of the WTO Agreement, it might well be possible that GATT general exceptions 
apply. Many of the other agreements in Annex 1A are extensions or interpretations of 
existing provisions of different articles in the GATT. It might be argued that if GATT Article 
XX applies to the provisions of GATT, it also applies to their broader version.192 In the US–
Shrimp (Thailand) the AB held that GATT Article XX could be used in defense of measures 
challenged under the Anti-dumping Agreement.193 In China–Audiovisual Services, the AB 
accepted the availability of a defense under GATT Article XX (a) of Chinese measures 
violating China’s Accession Protocol, as the Accession Protocol contained a reference to the 
provisions of the WTO Agreement. The AB further held that China has not demonstrated 
that the relevant provisions are ‘necessary’ to protect public morals, within the meaning of 
Article XX (a) of the GATT 1994 and that as a result China has not established that these 
provisions are justified under Article XX (a).194 The extent to which the scope of Article XX 
can be applied outside the GATT remains unclear and could only be decided by the WTO 
adjudicative bodies in future disputes, or by a decision of the WTO ministerial conference.  
 
Furthermore, two exceptions are of particular relevance to the protection of the 
environment: paragraphs (b) and (g) of Article XX. According to these two paragraphs, WTO 
members may adopt policy measures that are inconsistent with GATT disciplines, but 
necessary to protect human, animal or plant life or health (paragraph (b)), or relating to the 
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conservation of exhaustible natural resources (paragraph (g)).195 To justify the imposition of 
BCAs under these exceptions, a WTO member must perform a two-tier analysis proving: 
first, that the measure falls under at least one of the two environmental exceptions (e.g. 
paragraphs (b) or (g)); and, secondly, that the measure satisfies the requirement of the 
introductory paragraph (the chapeau of Article XX), i.e. that it is not applied in a manner 
which would constitute a means of arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination between 
countries where the same conditions prevail, or a disguised restriction on international 
law.196 Whilst the inclusion of these two exceptions suggests that WTO members may adopt 
laws that protect the environment at the expense of international trade, reliance on these 
exceptions has proven to be extremely difficult. It is also important to note that a measure 
can be considered under these two paragraphs at the same time, as different provisions of 
the WTO agreements can apply to different aspects of the measure.197 Global warming can 
affect both exhaustible natural resources (climate, animals etc) and at the same time pose a 
risk to human, animal and plant life and health (through diseases, high temperatures, 
hurricanes etc).198 In only two out of the approximately 14 disputes over environmental 
trade restrictions, the panel reports in EC–Asbestos and in US–Shrimp, has the DSB found 
that an environmental trade restriction actually met the requirements of Article XX.199 It is 
also important to note that the burden of showing that these requirements are met is 
always on the party who is defending a measure through GATT Article XX.200 
3.7.1 Requirement for justification under Article XX (b) 
 
Justification of BCA measures under Article XX (b) can raise a number of questions. Even if 
there are no doubts that climate change affects human, animal and plant life, there can still 
be a question as to whether BCAs are really ‘necessary’. Article XX (b) provides thus: 
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[Measures] necessary to protect human, animal or plant life or health… 
 
The test of necessity comprises an ‘ends and means’ analysis and a ‘weighing and balancing’ 
test.201  These tests reflect the balance in WTO agreements between two important goals: 
preserving the freedom of members to set and achieve regulatory objectives through 
measures of their own choosing, and discouraging members from adopting or maintaining 
measures that unduly restrict trade. Necessity tests typically achieve this balance by 
requiring that measures which restrict trade in some way (including by violating obligations 
of an agreement) are permissible only if they are ‘necessary’ to achieve the member’s policy 
objective.202 The key elements of the necessity test include:  
i. The analysis of the contribution of a measure to the achievement of the stated 
objective. 
The word ‘necessary’ as provided for under Article XX (b) requires the weighing and 
balancing of regulations of factors such as the contribution made by the measure to the 
enforcement of the law or regulation at issue, the relative importance of common interests 
or values protected, and the impact of the law on trade.203 In the same vein, the AB in 
Brazil–Retreaded Tyres noted that: 
[A] contribution exists when there is a genuine relationship of ends and means between the 
objective pursued and the measure at issue. To be characterized as necessary, a measure 
does not have to be indispensable. However, its contribution to the achievement of the 
objective must be material, not merely marginal or insignificant, especially if the measure at 
issue is as trade restrictive as an import ban.
204
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However, as to the level of protection which a country may establish by a measure in 
pursuit of a legitimate policy objective, the AB in EC–Asbestos noted that it is undisputed 
that WTO members have the right to determine the level of protection of health that they 
consider appropriate in a given situation. This should, however, be valid for the protection 
of the environment and climate. Moreover, the AB seems to accept the level of protection 
corresponding to zero risk (particularly, the risk of human health).205 
 
ii. The check of less trade-restrictive alternatives 
This element is to the effect that a WTO member cannot justify a measure inconsistent with 
another GATT provision as ‘necessary’ where a less trade-restrictive alternative measure is 
available to it.206  The concept of ‘necessary’ was assessed in Thailand Cigarettes207. The fact 
of the matter was that Thailand prohibited the importation of cigarettes and other tobacco 
preparations, but authorised the sale of domestic cigarettes. The US complained that the 
restrictions were inconsistent with GATT Article XI: I, and considered that they were justified 
neither by Article XI: 2 (c), nor by Article XX (b). Thailand argued that the import restrictions 
were justified under Article XX (b) because the government had adopted measures that 
could only be effective if cigarettes imports were prohibited and because chemicals and 
other addictives contained in the US cigarettes might make them more harmful than Thai 
cigarettes. The GATT panel in its decision pointed to the availability of other measures (e. g. 
a ban on the advertisement of domestic and imported cigarettes), which could achieve the 
health policy goals but, at the same time, would be less trade-restrictive than a ban on 
imports of cigarettes. The AB noted as follows: 
The import restrictions imposed by Thailand could be considered to be ‘necessary’ 
in terms of Article XX (b) only if there were no alternative measure consistent with 
the General Agreement or less inconsistent with it, which Thailand could reasonably 
be expected to employ to achieve its health policy objectives
208
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This ruling carries the implication that WTO members are restricted in finding measures that 
meet their policy goals. They are obliged to scrutinise all possible measures to ensure that 
they elect to apply only those measures that do not unduly restrict trade. In other words, if 
there are different ways of meeting policy objectives, members should choose measures 
that are the least restrictive of trade, even though they may not be optimum measures for 
ensuring human, animal or plant health or life.209 
 
In the EC–Asbestos case the panel looked at the issue of less inconsistent measures from 
another perspective, arguing that in determining whether a measure is necessary it is 
important to assess whether consistent or less inconsistent measures are reasonably 
available. The panel suggests that the availability of the measure should not be examined 
theoretically or in absolute terms, nor should it be interpreted loosely.210 The fact that, 
administratively, one measure may be easier to implement than another, does not mean 
that the measure is not reasonably available. The panel further held that reasonably 
available measures must be assessed in the light of economic and administrative realities 
facing the member concerned and by also taking into account the fact that the state must 
provide itself with the means of implementing its policies.211 In the same vein the AB in 
Brazil–Retreaded Tyres stated that in analysing whether there are alternative less trade-
restrictive measures, a country’s level of development should also be taken into 
consideration in that: 
The capacity of a country to implement remedial measures that would be 
particularly costly or would require advanced technologies may be relevant to the 
assessment of whether such measures or practices are reasonably available 
alternatives to a preventive measure, such as the import ban, which does not 
involve prohibitive costs or substantial technical difficulties.
212
 
 
However, proving the necessity of a measure under paragraph (b) of Article XX seems to be 
quite challenging.213 The possible explanation for such a strict threshold erected by the AB in 
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the analysis of the necessity of a measure under paragraph (b) is that otherwise it would be 
quite easy to disguise protectionism under the legitimate objective to protect human, 
animal or plant life or health. Thus, determining whether there is a risk to the life or health 
of people, animals or plants under paragraph (b) is more subjective than determining 
whether resources are exhaustible or not under paragraph (g).214 
 
In light of the strict interpretation of Article XX (b) it will be very difficult for countries who 
intend to implement BCAs to justify their measure under this sub-section; it has, however, 
been suggested using the environmental exception clause in Article XX (g)215 which to a very 
large extent provides for a less stringent requirement. 
 
3.7.2  Justification under Article XX (g) 
 
GATT Article XX (g) provides as follows: 
[R]elating to the conservation of exhaustible natural resources if such measures are made 
effective in conjunction with restrictions on domestic production or consumption.[own 
emphasis added]. 
The term ‘relating to’ as provided for in this Article requires a lower level of scrutiny in view 
of its broader meaning as compared to the requirement of ‘necessity’ under Article XX (b). 
The key element of this Article as it relates to BCAs includes: 
 
i. BCAs and the requirement of ‘exhaustible natural resources’ 
In the US–Gasoline dispute Venezuela and Brazil brought an action against the US on the 
basis that the US applied stricter rules to the chemical characteristics of imported gasoline 
than it did for domestically refined gasoline. Venezuela and Brazil claimed that the gasoline 
rule was inconsistent, among other things, with GATT Article III (national treatment) and 
was not covered by GATT Article XX. In determining what constitutes an exhaustible natural 
resource under Article XX (g), the panel and AB determined that clean air was an exhaustible 
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natural resource within the meaning of Article XX (g).216  Also, in the US–Shrimp case, four 
WTO members (India, Malaysia, Pakistan and Thailand) brought a joint complaint against a 
ban imposed by the US on the importation of certain shrimp and shrimp products from 
countries that had not been certified by the Department of State as having a comprehensive 
sea turtle conservation regime. The US argued that the measure was valid under Article XX 
(g).The AB, in reversing the panel report, held that the measure did fall under Article XX (g) 
and was justified. The AB in determining the term ‘exhaustible natural resources’ held that 
this includes living and non-living resources.217 
 
Most scholars find it uncontroversial that the earth’s atmosphere constitutes an 
‘exhaustible natural resources’, especially in light of the US–Shrimp case. Pauwelyn argues 
that considering the international importance given today to the problem of climate change 
and the catastrophic consequences that are linked to it for all forms of life on earth, it will 
be surprising if the WTO would not accept that the planet’s atmosphere (that is, the layer of 
gases around the earth that regulates the planet’s climate) is an ‘exhaustible natural 
resource’. The world’s atmosphere is, after all, a global commons, and carbon emissions are, 
because of their global impact, a collective action problem.218 To Kang, BCAs can be 
understood as a measure ‘for the conservation of exhaustible natural resources’, as they are 
primarily aimed at control of carbon leakage due to the different GHG control regimes 
around the world. In this way, BCAs ‘achieve stabilisation of GHG concentrations in the 
atmosphere at a level which prevents dangerous anthropogenic interference with the 
climate system’219. In addition, one of the objectives of BCAs is to control carbon leakage 
and ultimately decrease carbon consumption in the global level. In this regard, BCAs can be 
justified under GATT Article XX (g).220Holzer is of the opinion that the climate can also be 
viewed as a quality of the air, as it is usually defined as the average weather, i.e. 
atmospheric conditions over longer periods of time. Holzer also argues that, furthermore, 
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changes in climate lead to the depletion of other exhaustible natural resources, such as 
forestry, fisheries, biodiversity etc.221 
 
ii. BCAs and the requirement of ‘relating to the conservation of the planet’s 
atmosphere’ 
In US–Shrimp, the AB emphasised that there must be a close and genuine relationship of 
‘ends and means’.222 The measure in issue must not be ‘disproportionately wide in its scope 
and reach in relation to the policy objective of protection and conservation’ of the planet’s 
climate. Also, in US–Gasoline, the AB, in answering whether baseline establishment rules 
were ‘primarily aimed at’ the conservation of clean air, held that: 
The baseline establishment rules, whether individual or statutory, were designed to permit 
scrutiny and monitoring of the level of compliance of refiners, importers and blenders with 
“the non degradation” requirements. Without baselines of some kind, such scrutiny would 
not be possible and the Gasoline Rule’s objective of stabilizing and preventing further 
deterioration of the level of air pollution prevailing in 1990 would be substantially frustrated. 
We consider that, given that substantial relationship, the baseline establishment rules 
cannot be regarded as merely incidentally or inadvertently aimed at the conservation of 
clean air in the United States for the purposes of Article XX (g).
223
 
 
‘Relating to’ seems to suggest a rather loose relationship between the measure and its 
intended objective, conservation of an exhaustible resource. One would thus assume that 
other policy objectives (i.e. socio-economic objectives) may equally be an underlying 
rationale for the measure; however, as long as the measure still relates to the conservation 
of an exhaustible resource, it will pass muster. Requiring that it must be ‘primarily aimed’ at 
the conservation of an exhaustible resource requires a closer relationship between the 
measure and its underlying rationale.224 In US–Shrimp, the AB considered that the general 
structure and design of the measure in question were ‘fairly narrowly focused’ and that it 
was not a blanket prohibition of the importation of shrimp imposed without regard to the 
consequences of sea turtles; thus, the AB concluded that the regulation in question was a 
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measure ‘relating to’ the conservation of an exhaustible natural resource within the 
meaning of Article XX (g). The AB also found that the measure in question had been made 
effective in conjunction with the restrictions on domestic harvesting of shrimp, as required 
by Article XX (g). 
  
However, for BCAs to pass this test, it is important to declare that a measure is aimed at 
reducing emissions and preventing carbon leakage and not at restoring competitive 
positions for domestic producers. Since BTAs are traditionally perceived in the WTO as fiscal 
measures which put into effect, in whole or in part, the destination principle in order to 
level taxation and domestic regulation systems of exporting and importing countries that 
ultimately creates equal competitive conditions for domestic and foreign production in the 
home and world markets, it would be difficult to escape a competition-related motive of a 
measure.225 Therefore, if intending to defend a measure under Article XX, it may be more 
reasonable to position a measure as simply a border measure (e. g an import tariff), and not 
as a border adjustment measure.226 
 
iii. The measure in question must be ‘made effective in conjunction with 
restrictions on domestic production and consumption’. 
The AB in US–Gasoline noted that this is only a requirement of ‘even handedness’ in the 
imposition of restrictions and that there is no textual basis for requiring identical treatment 
of domestic and imported products.227 In other words, if BCAs legislation in some of its 
details was to discriminate against imports as opposed to domestic products, the measure 
as a whole will still be found to meet the test, as was the case in US–Gasoline. Furthermore, 
the mere fact that the imposition of a measure was driven by carbon leakage concerns 
proves that a measure is made effective in conjunction with restrictions on the domestic 
market proves.228 
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However, in the context of climate change, flowing from the provisions of Articles XX (b) and 
XX (g), a substantial link will need to be established between the trade measure and the 
environmental objective. It should be noted that in Brazil–Retreaded Tyres the AB 
recognised that certain complex environmental problems may be tackled only with a 
comprehensive policy comprising a multiplicity of interacting measures. The AB pointed out 
that the results obtained from certain actions – for instance, measures adopted in order to 
address global warming and climate change – can only be evaluated with the benefit of 
time.229 
3.7.3 BCAs and extra-territorial rules under Article XX 
 
In light of the analysis for justification of BCA measures under the provisions of Article XX, it 
will not be out of place to take into consideration the extra-territorial nature of these 
measures. Can a country through its measure impose its climate policy standards on 
another country? Or, should a country, on the territory of which emissions occurred, be held 
responsible for the changes in global climate and be forced to pay sanctions?230 
 
To justify an extraterritorially applied domestic measure what is required is a ‘sufficient 
nexus’ between the country abroad and the consequences for the country imposing the 
measure.231 Likewise, for BCAs measures applied at the border to be accepted, there must 
be a ‘sufficient nexus’ between carbon emissions in, for example, China and climate change 
consequences that such carbon emissions can have for the United States.232 However, in the 
Tuna–Dolphin dispute,233 the panel in determining the extraterritorial effect of the measures 
imposed took a strict approach. The panel found a ban on tuna to be unjustifiable under the 
GATT Article XX (b) exception, because the ban in question was used to protect dolphins 
abroad and not within the territory of the country imposing the measure. The panel found 
that: 
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 If the broad interpretation of Article XX (b) suggested by the United States were accepted, 
each contracting party could unilaterally determine the life or health protection policies from 
which other contracting parties could not deviate without jeopardizing their rights under the 
General Agreement. The General Agreement would then no longer constitute a multilateral 
framework for trade among all contracting parties but would provide legal security only in 
respect of trade between a limited number of contracting parties with identical internal 
regulations.
234
 
 
In US–Shrimp the AB in examining the extraterritorial effect of unilateral measures in 
respect of the ban placed on shrimps appeared to be tolerant. The AB found that: 
It appears to us, however, that conditioning access to a member’s domestic market 
on whether exporting members comply with or adopt, a policy or policies 
unilaterally prescribed by the importing member, to some degree, be a common 
aspect of measures falling within the scope of one or another of the exceptions (a) 
to (j) of Article XX.
235 
 
Finally, the fact that climate change is perceived as a global problem reaching out beyond 
national bounds should be considered. This could add more weight to the justification of 
measures applied extraterritorially.236 
3.7.4 BCAs and the conditions under the introductory phrase of Article XX 
 
Finally, even if a BCA measure passes the ‘necessity’ test under Article XX (b) or the 
‘exhaustible’, ‘relating to’, and ‘in conjunction with’ tests under Article XX (g) the BCA 
measures must satisfy the requirement of the chapeau to GATT Article XX. This Article 
requires that: 
[M]easures are not applied in a manner which would constitute a means of arbitrary or 
unjustifiable discrimination between countries where the same conditions prevail, or a 
disguised restriction on international trade.
237
 
                                                          
234
 Panel Report Tuna–Dolphin I: United States–Restrictions on Imports of Tuna, DS21/R, 3 September 1991, 
unadopted, BISD 39S/155. 
235
 AB Report US–Shrimp para 121.  
236
Holzer K (2010) 14. 
237
 A similar provision is contained in Article 3.5 of the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change 
(UNFCCC), which provides that measures taken to combat climate change, including unilateral ones, should 
not constitute a means of arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination or a disguised restriction on international 
trade.  
 
 
 
 
56 
 
The chapeau requires that the measure does not constitute an abuse or misuse of the 
provisional justification made available under one of the paragraphs of Article XX, that is to 
say, that the measure is applied in good faith.238 The AB in US–Shrimp explained the 
requirement of the chapeau as follows: 
There are three standards contained in the chapeau: first, arbitrary discrimination between 
countries where the same conditions prevail; second, unjustifiable discrimination between 
countries where the same conditions prevail; and third, a disguised restriction on 
international trade. In order for a measure to be applied in a manner which would constitute 
“arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination between countries where the same conditions 
prevail”, three elements must exist. First, the application of the measure must result in 
discrimination… Second, the discrimination must be arbitrary or unjustifiable in character… 
Third, this discrimination must occur between countries where the same conditions prevail. 
In United States–Gasoline, we accepted the assumption of the participants in that appeal 
that such discrimination could occur not only between different exporting members, but also 
between exporting members and the importing member concerned.239 
 
This requirement serves to ensure that the right of members to avail themselves of 
exceptions is exercised in good faith to protect interests considered legitimate under Article 
XX, and not as a means to circumvent members’ obligations towards other WTO 
members.240In  US– Gasoline the AB held that: 
The chapeau is animated by the principle that while the exceptions of Article XX may be 
invoked as a matter of legal right, they should not be applied so as to frustrate or defeat the 
legal obligations of the holder of the right under the substantive rules of the General 
Agreement. If those exceptions are not to be abused or misused, in other words, the 
measures falling within the particular exceptions must be applied reasonably, with due 
regard both to the legal duties of the party claiming the exception and the legal rights of the 
other parties concerned.241 
 
Meeting the requirement of the chapeau seems crucial for BCAs to be justified under Article 
XX, particularly since in recent years the WTO adjudicative bodies have moved from 
focusing on purely technical features of a measure to analysing the overall design of a 
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measure, i.e. they have moved from over emphasising the subparagraphs of the article to 
putting more emphasis on the conditions of the chapeau.242 In all cases where the AB found 
that the GATT Article XX exception was not met, it did so under the provision of the 
chapeau. For present purposes as well this phrase may well be the most important provision 
in the entire GATT Agreement.243  The legitimacy of the declared policy objective with a 
measure, and the relationship of that objective with the measure itself and its general 
design and structure are to be examined under the paragraphs and not the chapeau.244 It is 
important to note that the chapeau is not about BCA legislation as such, but about its 
‘detailed operating provisions’ and how it is ‘actually applied’. Thus, the standards of the 
chapeau project both substantive and procedural requirements.245 
 
3.7.5 Testing BCA measures with regard to non-discrimination between countries with 
the same conditions 
 
This requirement of the chapeau is to the effect that for any BCA legislation to be justified 
under the chapeau of Article XX there must not be arbitrary discrimination in the application 
of the measure ‘between countries where the same conditions prevail’. The discrimination 
under Article XX (arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination between countries where the 
same conditions prevail) differs in ‘nature and quality’ or ‘go[es] beyond’ the discrimination 
referred to earlier under national treatment (GATT Article III) and MFN (GATT Article I). 
Under Articles I and III, the discrimination is focused on ‘like products’, while under Article 
XX it is focused on ‘countries where the same conditions prevail’. This requirement can be 
interpreted as a requirement to take account of conditions in different countries.246 
 
Furthermore, the AB in Brazil–Retreaded Tyres held that determining whether 
discrimination is arbitrary or unjustifiable usually involves analysis that relates primarily to 
the cause or the rationale of the discrimination.247 The AB further held that there is arbitrary 
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or unjustifiable discrimination when a measure provisionally justified under a paragraph of 
Article XX is applied discriminatorily ‘between countries where the same conditions prevail’, 
and when the reasons given for this discrimination bear no rational connection to the 
objective falling within the purview of a paragraph of Article XX, or would go against the 
objective.248 
 
However, it has been argued that the distinction between discrimination under Articles I 
and III and discrimination under Articles XX should lie in the realm of formal and substantive 
discrimination. Formal discrimination denotes treatment in which circumstances are not 
factored in. In other words, from a trade perspective all WTO members are treated the 
same regardless of their circumstances. This formal discrimination approach is illustrated by 
the use of ‘like product’ used in Article I and Article III analysis. Once two products are found 
to be alike, no discrimination is allowed, regardless of the circumstances that may exist in 
their countries of origin, and, from an environmental perspective, regardless of the impact 
they may have on the environment of origin.249 Substantive discrimination, on the other 
hand, takes into account the circumstances of a country. In other words, those who are 
differently situated are treated differently. That this is the form of discrimination operating 
in Article XX seems clear from the wording of the chapeau, which refers to arbitrary or 
unjustifiable discrimination between countries where the same conditions prevail.250 
 
Weirs is of the opinion that it would seem that in more complicated so-called de facto 
discrimination cases, it would be more difficult to keep the objective of the measure 
completely out of the discrimination analysis under Articles I and III. He further points out 
that, given the strong link the AB now makes between the objective of a measure and its 
discriminatory application, the doubling of the discrimination analysis looms large.251 
Flowing from WTO jurisprudence, when examining whether a BCA legislation amounts to 
arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination between countries where the same conditions 
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prevail, the AB, based on its previous decisions in environmental disputes, will most likely 
refer to the following elements:252 
 
i. Can a country imposing a BCA measure require that its climate policy be copied by 
exporting countries or does it essentially take into consideration climate policy 
measures obtainable in exporting countries? 
This requirement raises the question as to whether a country imposing a BCA measure 
requires that its climate policy be copied by exporting countries or whether it accepts and 
takes into account climate policy measures previously taken in exporting countries to 
combat climate change. 
 
In the US–Shrimp case the US required all other exporting members, if they wished to 
exercise their GATT rights, to adopt essentially the same policy (together with an approved 
enforcement program) as that applied to, and enforced on, US domestic shrimp trawlers. 
The AB, in rejecting the ban, found that it has an ‘intended and actual coercive effect on the 
specific policy decisions made by foreign governments’.253When, in response, the US no 
longer required the ‘adoption of essentially the same policy’ but rather the ‘adoption of a 
program comparable ineffectiveness’ to that of the US program, the AB held that this 
‘allows for sufficient flexibility in the application of the measure so as to avoid “arbitrary or 
unjustifiable discrimination”’.254 
This interpretation may, however, bring about the following practical implications. On the 
one hand, this may force a country like the US to consider whether a foreign country has 
already imposed emissions cut or otherwise addressed climate change and, in turn, to 
impose lower requirement for imports from countries that have such policies in place. On 
the other hand, this may oblige developed countries to take into consideration the climate 
policy measures of developing countries, and to impose a graduated import tax or 
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regulation depending on the stage of economic development of the foreign country in 
question.  
 
This practical implication would bring about comparison between emissions reduction 
systems and climate policies in different countries. Such comparison would be a very 
difficult task, especially when comparisons were being made between price-based and non 
price-based climate policy measures.255 However, things become more complicated when, 
for instance, exemptions are made for goods from countries having a cap-and-trade system 
in place comparable to that in the importing country, while other exporting countries have 
no cap-and-trade system but have regulatory restrictions on emissions of its industry. In this 
case, the answer to the question as to whether the same conditions prevail in the countries 
that are compared to each other becomes less clear-cut.256 
 
Furthermore, this raises an interesting question as to how the effectiveness of climate policy 
measures (comparable action)257 put in place by countries should be assessed. It has, 
however, been argued that to define comparable efforts towards climate mitigation and 
adaptation, differences in national circumstances (such as current level of development, per 
capita GDP, current and historical emissions, emission intensity, and per capita emissions ) 
clearly need to be taken into account.258 It has also been argued in light of the US–Shrimp 
dispute that if climate parties fail to adopt an international standard when determining 
comparability, and have not made an effort to discipline the use of unilateral measures by 
parties, the panel will have no choice but to fall back on the US–Shrimp jurisprudence, and 
may be influenced by the comparable standard put in place by the US.259 To take account of 
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the conditions prevailing in other countries might also imply that a country which imposes 
BCAs on imports would have to check and ensure that the products imported from other 
countries had not already been taxed with a similar tax on carbon in their home countries 
and had received no tax rebates on exportation. Otherwise, there would be a problem of 
double taxation as a consequence of ignorance of conditions prevailing in other countries.260 
 
Finally, this requirement of the chapeau to take account of conditions prevailing in different 
countries might also enable a country imposing a BCA measure to differentiate the 
strictness of a measure between countries (developing and developed countries) so long as 
‘different conditions’ prevail in those countries, and even to exempt products of LDCs.261 In 
other words, the chapeau of Article XX might force the imposing country to have a lower, or 
even no, carbon restrictions on imports from developing countries, especially the very poor 
ones.  
ii. Can the implementation and administration of proposed BCA legislation satisfy the 
conditions of ‘basic fairness and due process’? 
In examining this element, the WTO adjudicative bodies may look at the procedure of 
applying the carbon measure and whether the process is transparent and predictable. The 
system also has to be non-discriminatory in its procedures.  
 
The issue of when the measure will apply to other countries to respond with comparable 
climate mitigation measures is crucial. It is expected that developing countries need 
reasonable time to develop and implement national climate change policies and this is 
consequent upon the fact that they are not at par with the developed countries and as such 
will need more time to adjust to the realities on ground.  In US–Shrimp, the AB noted as 
follows: 
The length of the “phase in” time is inconsequential for exporting countries desiring 
certification. That period relates directly to the onerousness of the burdens of complying 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
http://www.unep.org/climatechange/LinkClick.aspx?fileticket=zb4Wio0kiAI%3D&tabid=389&language=en-US 
(accessed 18 February 2011). 
260
Holzer K (2010) 18. 
261
Pauwelyn J ‘Testimony Before the Subcommittee on Trade of the House Committee on Ways and Means’  
(2009) available at http://democrats.waysandmeans.house.gov/media/pdf/111/pauw.pdf  (accessed 18 March 
2011). 
 
 
 
 
62 
 
with the requisites of certification and the practical feasibility of locating and developing 
alternative export markets for shrimp. The shorter that period, the heavier the burdens of 
compliance.
262
 
 
Further, it has been suggested in light of the US draft climate legislation that the grace 
period should be at least 10 years after the US emissions trading scheme starts working. To 
take any comparable actions within a shorter time-frame would not be viable for developing 
countries, given their limited resources and weak environmental institutions. During this 
grace period, developed countries also need to provide incentives to encourage developing 
countries to do more. In other words, carrots should serve as the main means. Sticks can be 
incorporated, but only if they are credible, realistic and serve as a useful supplement.263 
 
iii. Did countries proposing to impose a BCA measure try other, less trade-restrictive 
ways to address the problem, such as engaging in ‘serious, across-the-board 
negotiations with the objective of concluding bilateral or multilateral agreements’ to 
address climate change?264 
The conclusion of an agreement is not paramount at this stage. What is of relevance is for 
there to be serious ‘good effort’ to negotiate an international agreement among the parties 
concerned.265 It is also important to note that such negotiations must be done on a non-
discriminatory basis.266 
 
However, the above reasoning of the AB has raised some interesting puzzles in respect to 
regional trade agreements. Thus, if, for instance, the EU links its partners of the European 
Economic Area to its emissions trading system (ETS) and excludes their exports to the EU 
from a carbon adjustment obligation, does that mean it must devote similar efforts to 
include all WTO members into its ETS? In other words, what is the relationship between 
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GATT Article XX and GATT Article XXIV on regional trade agreements in the climate policy 
context?267 
 
It has been noted based on the US–Shrimp dispute that the AB found an effort to negotiate 
a multilateral agreement with other countries only in US–Shrimp relating to paragraph (g) of 
Article XX, whereas in the disputes falling under other paragraphs of Article XX this 
requirement was not raised. This leads to the conclusion that the requirements of the 
chapeau of Article XX can be interpreted differently depending on the paragraph of the 
Article under which the measure falls.268 
 
It is also important to note that, flowing from the facts of US–Shrimp, the AB pointed to the 
fact that the US has not ratified three multilateral environmental agreements (MEAS) 
relating to turtle conservation. This, however, raises the question of whether the non-
ratification of the Kyoto Protocol or a future international climate change agreement can 
deprive a country of the right to seek the justification of BCA measures under GATT Article 
XX.269 This will be left for the WTO adjudicative bodies to decide. 
3.7.6 Testing BCAs with respect to the requirement of disguised restriction on 
international trade as provided in the chapeau 
 
The requirement of a measure not being a disguised restriction on international trade is a 
very important measure that has to be fulfilled under the provision of the chapeau. The AB 
in the US–Gasoline case noted that ‘concealed’ or ‘unannounced’ restriction or 
discrimination in international trade does not exhaust the meaning of ‘disguised restriction’. 
The kinds of considerations pertinent in deciding whether the application of a particular 
measure amounts to ‘arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination’ may also be taken into 
account in determining the presence of a disguised restriction on international trade.270 The 
AB noted as follows: 
“Arbitrary discrimination”, “unjustifiable discrimination” and “disguised restriction” on international 
trade may, accordingly, be read side-by-side; they impart meaning to one another. It is clear to us that 
“disguised restriction” includes disguised discrimination in international trade. It is equally clear that 
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concealed or unannounced restriction or discrimination in international trade does not exhaust the 
meaning of “disguised restriction”, whatever else it covers, may properly be read as embracing 
restrictions amounting to arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination in international trade taken under 
the guise of a measure formally within the terms of an exception listed in Article XX. Put in a 
somewhat different manner, the kinds of considerations pertinent in deciding whether the 
application of a particular measure amounts to “arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination” may also be 
taken into account in determining the presence of a “disguised restriction” on international trade. The 
fundamental theme is to be found in the purpose and object of avoiding abuse or illegitimate use of 
the exceptions to substantive rules available in Article XX.
271
 
 
 
It is also important to note that an environmental measure may not constitute a ‘disguised 
restriction on international trade’, i.e. may not result in protectionism. In past cases, it was 
found that the protective application of a measure could most often be discerned from its 
‘design, architecture and revealing structure’.272 For instance, in US–Shrimp (Article 21.5), 
the AB found that the fact that the revised measure allowed exporting countries to apply 
programmes not based on the mandatory use of turtle excluder devices (TEDs), and offered 
technical assistance to develop the use of TEDs in third countries, showed that the measure 
was not applied so as to constitute a disguised restriction on international trade.273 
3.8 Conclusion 
 
This chapter has examined the compatibility of BCA measures with the existing WTO/GATT 
rules, considering the fact that such measures are not expressly provided for under the 
existing legal framework. It is not clear whether BTAs on carbon emission costs are 
permitted under the current rules on BTAs considering the fact that this tax is levied not on 
products but on the production methods. However, even if they are not permitted by those 
rules, they could still be justified under Article XX of the GATT. Additionally, based on the 
above analysis, it is crystal clear that GATT Articles I: I and III: 2 place some likely constraints 
on the implementation of BCAs. These constraints are not over limiting and can also be 
justified under the provision of Article XX. In relying on Article XX, countries proposing the 
imposition of BCAs can rely either on paragraph (b) for a measure to protect human, animal 
or plant life or health, or paragraph (g) for a measure relating to the conservation of 
exhaustible natural resources, provided that the requirement of the chapeau of Article XX is 
met. Flowing from the above analyses, justifying a BCA measure under paragraph (b) will be 
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very difficult considering the requirement of ‘necessity’. Thus, a BCA measure will most 
likely be justified under paragraph (g), ‘relating to’, which requires a less stringent 
requirement. 
 
Furthermore, justification under Article XX is largely dependent on the requirement of the 
chapeau of Article XX. It requires that an implementing country must take into account 
conditions in other countries. In other words, it requires essentially that the measure should 
be flexible enough to treat more favourably imports from countries which had taken 
emission reduction efforts in any form, and to differentiate in treatment depending on a 
country’s level of economic development. If not, the tax could be found to amount to 
unjustifiable discrimination between countries where the same conditions prevail. It also 
requires that a measure should take into consideration the rights and obligations of an 
exporting country under an international climate agreement. 
 
Finally, this mini-thesis presumes that for a BCA measure to fit within the scope of Article XX 
it will be reasonable to design it not as a BTA measure but rather as a border measure (e. g 
carbon tariff). This is, however, premised on the fact that BTAs may fall outside the scope of 
Article XX considering the motive behind it, which is to address the issue of competition by 
leveling the playing field of producers, and also because of the traditionally symmetric 
application of border adjustment -- not only imposing emissions charges on imports, but 
also giving rebates (of allowances/emission costs) to exporters, which would run contrary to 
the climate policy goals. A tariff linked to carbon will most likely be qualified as an ordinary 
customs duty in excess of a bound tariff ceiling under a country’s schedule of concessions 
and therefore found to be a violation of Article II: (b). The next chapter will however 
examine the possible institutional solutions that can be adopted to provide a last long 
solution to the likely violation of BCA measures with the WTO law. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
66 
 
CHAPTER FOUR 
Institutional solutions within the WTO and the UNFCCC 
  
4.1 Introduction 
 
Having examined the likely violations of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) 
rules if border carbon adjustments measures (BCAs) are implemented, and the possible 
justification of such violations under Article XX of the GATT, it is important to note that the 
justification of a measure can only be achieved through litigation between the parties 
involved in the dispute. This means that the problem of violation of the GATT will have to be 
brought before the world trade organisation (WTO) adjudicative bodies each time anew if 
there is any violation of WTO rules. Therefore, there seems to be a need for a long-lasting 
solution to the problem of WTO violation of the proposed implementation of BCA measures. 
 
Different proposals have been made to this effect. One proposal is that WTO members 
should introduce a new agreement, the General Agreement on Trade and Emissions (GATE), 
to reduce greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions through international trade.274 Another proposal 
is to adopt a protocol or resolution on trade-related climate policy measures among the 
parties to the United Nation Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC).275 It has 
also been suggested that a working group shared by the WTO and UNFCCC be 
established.276 Suffice to say, whatever track is chosen, it is unfeasible today to create one 
global super-regulatory forum for gradual co-ordination and harmonisation of trade-related 
instruments of climate policy.277 This chapter examines a range of possible institutional 
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solutions under the WTO and UNFCCC in addition to the available justification under Article 
XX of the GATT. 
4.2 Solutions within the WTO 
 
4.2.1 Dispute settlement approach 
 
The most obvious way to determine whether BCAs are compatible with WTO agreements is 
to let the dispute settlement system run its course. Eventually, following this approach, a 
record of decided cases will define the contours of WTO obligations.278 To date, there is no 
WTO case law that clarifies for us whether an energy tax such as a carbon tax is a direct tax 
or an indirect tax. Nor is there any WTO case law that tells us whether a tax on inputs, such 
as fossil fuels, that are not physically incorporated into a final product is a tax that can be 
adjusted at the border under WTO rules. Ideally, these unanswered questions should be 
answered by the consensus of WTO members through negotiation. Necessarily, they may 
have to be answered by WTO jurists in litigation.279 However, the possible outcome of such 
litigation would be difficult to predict. On the one hand, it is unlikely that the WTO 
adjudicative bodies would authorise trade-restrictive measures which are not even 
authorised by the relevant Multilateral Environmental Agreement (MEA), i.e. the 
UNFCCC/Kyoto Protocol. On the other hand, the public awareness of the importance of 
climate change mitigation is so strong that it might influence a WTO panel’s decision to 
accept such measures.280 
 
The advantage of the dispute settlement approach is that parties to the dispute will not lose 
anything from the outcome of the litigation, not even a defendant (i.e. a country which 
imposed a measure). Even if a measure were found to violate WTO law, there would be no 
sanctions imposed on a country for its past action, and the country could thus change its 
legislation upon an eventual decision of a panel or the Appellate Body (AB), or offer a 
compensation for its refusal to comply with the decision under Article 22 of the Dispute 
                                                          
278
Hufbauer GC & Kim J ‘The WTO and climate change: Challenges and options’ Working paper (2009) 12 
available at http://www.iie.com/publications/wp/wp09-9.pdf(accessed 10 April 2011). 
279
 Bacchus J ‘Questions in Search of Answers: Trade, Climate, and the Rule of Law’ Keynote address (2010) 3-4   
available at http://www.gtlaw.com/portalresource/bacchus1(accessed 16 February 2011). 
280
Holzer K (2010) 24. 
 
 
 
 
68 
 
Settlement Understanding (DSU). In other words, WTO remedies are purely prospective and 
not retrospective.281 For example, in the Hormone-treated Beef dispute,282 the WTO 
repeatedly condemned the European Communities (EC) for unjustifiably banning hormone-
treated US beef. Yet, the EC got away with this ‘illegal’ ban, first by suffering US retaliatory 
import restrictions for years, and secondly by offering the US more market access 
elsewhere, in a move that recently ended the dispute.283 
 
However, the dispute settlement approach has its own shortcomings. First, is that it could 
take a long time before clear guidelines becomes apparent. A big WTO case can easily take 
three years to run its full course from consultations to a panel decision and finally to a ruling 
by the AB. As trade battles are fought some countries may become more devoted to 
winning legal cases than fighting the common enemy, climate change.284 Secondly, in light 
of the political sensitivity about this issue in every part of the world, leaving WTO jurists to 
judge such disputes may result in a perilous political overload of the WTO dispute 
settlement system.285 Thirdly, is that some countries, faced with an adverse ruling, may 
come to question the legitimacy of WTO pronouncements on a subject as contentious as 
climate change. If the AB is too lenient on trade-related climate measures, by according 
users of unilateral subsidies and barriers excessive deference, that could open the door to 
opportunistic protectionism and rent-seeking behavior. If the AB is too strict, countries may 
ask why the WTO is making itself an opponent of a measure designed to save the planet.286 
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4.2.2  Amendment of relevant WTO rules 
 
Another proposal that has been suggested, is to amend the Articles of the GATT and other 
parts of the WTO legal text to accommodate environmental controls. 287 In other words, to 
‘green’ the GATT and other WTO agreements by rewriting longstanding WTO rules to take 
climate and other environmental considerations more fully into account.288 It has been 
suggested that the provision of Article XX of the GATT be amended by inserting a provision 
that creates an exception for multilateral environmental agreements (MEAs) or by 
interpreting Article XX in a manner that would validate existing MEAs and allow for future 
MEAs.289 
 
However, this is going to be a very difficult task to achieve considering the procedure of 
amendment under the WTO. Pursuant to Article X: 2 of the Marrakesh Agreement 
establishing the WTO, changes to the vital provisions of WTO agreements, including the 
MFN principle of GATT Article I and the tariff concessions of GATT Article II, can take effect 
only upon acceptance of all WTO members. Amendments to other provisions, as well as 
decisions and understandings on interpretation of WTO provisions (Article IX: 2 of the WTO 
Agreement), require two-thirds of WTO members’ votes. To achieve such consensus at this 
critical time, when developing countries are opposing the implementation of BCA measures, 
would be practically impossible.290 
4.2.3 A waiver 
 
Another suggestion that has been put forward which is less demanding than amendment of 
the WTO existing agreements is the granting of a waiver to WTO obligations for trade 
commitments written in a climate agreement. A waiver under the WTO rules requires 
approval from at least three-quarters of members at the ministerial conference and is 
usually given only in exceptional circumstances, for a limited time, and can only be extended 
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based on justified reasons.291 This would not provide any permanence to the likely violation 
of WTO rules. Furthermore, a measure applied under a waiver can still be challenged under 
Article XXIII (b), which provides for the grounds on non-violation leading to nullification or 
impairment of WTO rights. Whether this route has much promise largely depends on the 
extent of overlap between signatories to the climate change agreement and the WTO 
membership. If a significant number of WTO members do not sign the climate accord, the 
prospects of a waiver seem slight.292 
 
4.2.4  Bilateral approach: BCA provisions in regional or bilateral trade agreements 
 
The WTO rules allow for the possibility of regional integration and bilateral agreements for 
members who wish to liberalise at a quicker pace. This allows a small group of countries to 
negotiate rules and commitments that go beyond what is often possible at the multilateral 
level.293 Over the past few years the number of regional trade agreements (RTAs) has 
significantly increased and is expected to reach 400 if the RTAs currently under negotiations 
are to be concluded. RTAs have become so widespread that practically all WTO members 
are now parties to one or more of them. However, it might be possible for countries who 
are involved in RTAs to include provisions on BCAs which will prevent the imposition of BCA 
measures on countries who are parties to the RTAs.294 The experience of the WTO shows 
that many sensitive trade-related issues were first negotiated bilaterally or at the regional 
level and only then were brought to the multilateral negotiations in the WTO.295 
 
Why are countries pursuing RTAs? Continuous stalemates of negotiations at the WTO and 
ensuing frustrations could be the reasons. In a broader sense, however, such a phenomenon 
in fact is a manifestation of how, when it comes to contentious global issues, forging for a 
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regional consensus through regional co-operation can be instrumental.296More often than 
not the merit of regional forums is underestimated, but greater use of regional approaches 
could open possible avenues to advance negotiations, for expanding the use of regional 
forums would mean that an increasing number of forums would be available for countries 
to pursue their agendas and interact through the forums, which might in turn allow them to 
surmount political obstacles that impede negotiations.297 
 
In addition, regional forums can serve as a useful venue for setting an agenda that can 
provide an additional space for discussing specific issues. They can also provide countries 
with an opportunity to co-ordinate their positions among themselves before they move to 
the multilateral arena, and so to reach consensus before they face the pressures of drafting 
the text. In this way, regional forums may provide a platform for co-operation, and serve as 
a bridge between the global and national.298Furthermore, regional negotiations involve 
fewer participants and their interests in the outcome of such negotiations are usually 
coherent.  
 
In view of this, environmental provisions, and provisions on climate policy trade-related 
measures in particular, could just be part of a much broader agreement on economic co-
operation, which would include trade, investment, government procurement and other 
issues. Therefore, even if such provisions were contrary to the interests of one of the parties 
to the agreement, there would always be something which could be given by the other 
parties in compensation for this, especially if one of the parties is a developed country 
which can exercise its political and economic power or can offer concessions in other 
areas.299  Today, many RTAs, especially between the Organisation for Economic Co-
operation and Development (OECD) and developing countries, contain environmental 
provisions relating to the implementation of climate policy. Some bilateral agreements 
include chapters or annexes on co-operation on issues under the Kyoto Protocol. For 
instance, the Agreement between Japan and Mexico for the Strengthening of the Economic 
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Partnership provides, in its Article 147 on environmental co-operation, to promote capacity 
and institution building related to the implementation of the Clean Development 
Mechanism (CDM) projects under the Kyoto Protocol. Other RTAs contain provisions on the 
liberalisation of trade in environmental goods and services.300 
 
Despite the potential opportunities presented by RTAs in the context of addressing climate 
change, a number of challenges remain. One of such challenge is that the RTAs regime is still 
new and evolving. As of today, there are only a few RTAs whose implementation of 
environmental provisions has been evaluated. Thus, it remains to be seen whether 
environmental co-operation provisions reflected in a number of RTAs have been successfully 
implemented, and, moreover, whether the potential contribution of RTAs to tackling climate 
change will be realised. 301 Nevertheless, the option of RTAs to address climate change 
issues needs to be further considered. Finally, the inclusion of BCA measures in regional or 
bilateral agreements would largely depend on the objectives, nature and scope of these 
agreements. Some RTAs aim at establishing free trade areas, while others seek to establish 
partnerships or regional integration.302 
 
4.2.5 Plurilateral approach: A code of good practice on border adjustments 
 
Hufbauer, Charnovitz and Kim propose a WTO Code of good practice on GHGs Emissions 
control which will delineate a large ‘green space’ for measures that are designed to limit 
GHG emissions both within the territory of the member country and globally.303 They define 
‘green space’ as a policy space for climate measures that are imposed in a manner broadly 
consistent with core WTO principles even if a technical violation of WTO law occurs. 
Measures that conform with the ‘green space’ rules would not be subject to challenge in 
WTO dispute settlements by governments subscribing to the Code. In other words, there 
would be a ‘peace clause’ to head off disputes in the WTO between countries that subscribe 
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to this Code. If a government did not subscribe to the Code, then the code would have no 
effect on that government’s obligations and procedural rights in the WTO.304 
 
The Code is designed to address issues related to production process methods (PPM)-
related climate policy measures, such as carbon taxes, emission allowance requirements, 
and carbon-intensity standards, to free distribution of allowances from government to 
domestic firms and use of non-specific climate-related domestic subsidies, i.e. the measures 
which otherwise would constitute a violation of GATT Article III: 2, the Agreement on 
Technical Barriers to Trade, and the Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures. 
This Code is also designed to address issues relating to ‘comparable action’ taken by 
countries.305 
 
Furthermore, Hufbauer, Charnovitz and Kim propose the following guidelines for the ‘green 
space’. First, producer responsibility for the climate externalities of exported production 
should be maintained, but importing nations should be allowed to take additional measures, 
consistent with their national regimes, to address the externalities of consumption. Thus, 
the rule for exports would be that no GHG control measure shall accord more favourable 
treatment to exported products than to like products used or consumed domestically by the 
member country. In other words, rules akin to the ‘origin system’ for border tax adjustment 
(BTA) shall apply to exports of carbon-intensive products, so that trade-related GHG 
measures are not waived for exports. It is believed that this would achieve two goals: (1) it 
would simplify international accounting of emissions between two countries that both 
impose equivalent GHG control on imported goods, and (2) it would discourage countries 
from promoting carbon-intensive production for shipment to countries that do not impose 
GHG control measures on imported goods, or that impose lighter controls than the 
exporting country.306 
 
Secondly, to encourage other countries to impose their own carbon taxes on production, 
whether for domestic use or export use, it is proposed to take account of the amount of 
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taxes paid by foreign producers in their countries and not rebated on exportation, so that 
the revenue will be kept by the government of an exporting country.307 
 
Thirdly, free allocation of allowances would not be deemed to be a subsidy, unless the 
distribution is export-contingent. As regards climate subsidies, they would not be regarded 
as prohibited or actionable, unless they were specific, or export-contingent, or encouraged 
the use of domestic over imported goods. An export subsidy could be allowed, however, if 
the subsidised export replaced a traditional, carbon-intensive energy production with an 
alternative energy source in the importing country. For this, the exporting country’s 
government would have to make public a credible statement from the importing country’s 
government, confirming the replacement.308 Also, members of the code could agree to 
allow other Code members to impose trade measures on them in response to non-
compliance with international commitments. It is assumed that the workability of such an 
approach would decrease the amount of complaints to the WTO.309 
 
However, the implementation of the Code in practice may be faced with some difficulties. 
First, there is a problem with the legal form of the Code. It has been argued by proponents 
of the Code that if it qualifies as a plurilateral WTO agreement, then the WTO dispute 
settlement body could be used by Code members. If the Code is outside the WTO, then a 
WTO panel could be asked to take the Code into account as an inter se agreement among 
parties.310 It is also important to note that this legal form has some obvious shortcomings: 
first, in order to be added to Annex 4 of the WTO agreement, a consensus of all WTO 
members would be required to add it formally to the WTO’s treaty. It seems highly unlikely 
that such consensus would be found, as not many WTO members would be willing to give 
the green light to carbon-related trade restrictions, even if the Code were limited only to a 
plurilateral arrangement.311 Secondly, it is not clear how many and which WTO members 
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would sign such a plurilateral agreement. Non-participation of major GHG emitters would 
make the Code hollow.312 
 
Finally, it is not clear how narrowly defined the term ‘technical violation’ is and how 
different it is from a violation of core ‘WTO principles’. It seems to be quite a vague and 
disputable issue that might create many obstacles for effective settlement of disputes 
between WTO members, should they arise.313 
4.2.6 Peace clause 
 
At a much lower level of ambition than a Code, amendment or plurilateral approach, it has 
been proposed that key WTO members should consider adopting a time-limited ‘peace 
clause’ in their national legislation. This clause would prohibit any challenges in WTO 
dispute settlement to certain national actions taken to address climate change while the 
world works toward the conclusion of global climate treaty. This could be by adoption of a 
‘decision’ by WTO members interpreting the WTO Agreement, which would require the 
support of three-quarters of the members.314 
 
The great advantage of a peace clause approach is that it buys time. One disadvantage, 
however, as the WTO itself experienced with respect to the peace clause over agricultural 
subsidies adopted in the Doha Round, is that negotiations might not move with energy or 
speed. A second disadvantage is that during the peace clause period the urgency of limiting 
GHG emissions might be diluted. Some developed countries might go easy on their own 
GHG controls due to competitiveness concerns, while some developing countries might feel 
less pressure to flatten their GHG trajectories.315 
4.3 Solutions within the UNFCCC 
 
The UNFCCC can also be used as an avenue to address trade-related climate policy 
measures. According to Pascal Lamy, Director-General of the WTO, the WTO is currently 
overloaded with the task of the Doha Development Agenda, and to become involved now in 
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extra negotiations on the permissibility of trade-related climate policy measures would lead 
to frustration. He further emphasises that the relationship between trade and climate 
change would be best defined by an international accord on climate change that embraces 
all polluters. In other words, he suggests that trade-related climate policy measures be 
addressed by a post-Kyoto Agreement between parties to the UNFCCC.316 
 
Suffice to say, a resolution or a protocol on climate policy border adjustment measures that 
was adopted within the UNFCCC would not be legally binding for the WTO adjudicative 
bodies, were a dispute to be brought to the WTO.317 The ideal solution would be to have 
provisions on BCAs and other trade-related measures in a comprehensive international 
post-Kyoto climate agreement with its own dispute settlement system deciding on 
compliance with these rules, and in parallel to have an agreement between WTO members 
on the relationship between climate change and the WTO agreements. In this case, all 
conflicts between the two bodies of international law would be precluded. However, given 
the different interests of the negotiating partners both in the UNFCCC and in the WTO, this 
solution is hardly feasible.318 
 
The issue of BCAs is one of the most contentious in the UNFCCC negotiations on a future 
climate regime. Developing countries such as China and India are vehement opponents of 
such measures, as they fear that this would be just another excuse for protectionism and 
would considerably impede their exports of carbon-intensive products. The culmination of 
discussions over the possibility to impose such measures on the part of developed countries 
was reached by the end of the preparations to the Conference of Parties (COP 15) in 
Copenhagen in late 2009, after which this issue was dropped from the final agenda of the 
conference as one which could devastate the negotiating process. The final document of the 
conference, the Copenhagen Accord, contains references neither to border adjustment nor 
to any trade-related measures which might be used in support of climate policy.319 Also, at 
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the recently concluded Cancun Conference, held in December 2010, the issue of border 
adjustment was not on the agenda.320 
 
Furthermore, it is possible for parties to the UNFCCC to negotiate an agreement on the non 
use or restricted use of BCAs. Such an agreement may be a provision included in the post-
Kyoto climate agreement or a separately signed agreement. At a meeting of the Ad-hoc 
Working Group on Long Term Co-operative Action (AWG-LCA) of the UNFCCC in Bonn, India 
proposed the inclusion of the following paragraph in the negotiating text of a post-Kyoto 
agreement for the Copenhagen Conference in 2009: 
Developed country parties shall not resort to any form of unilateral measures, including 
countervailing border measures, against goods and services imported from developing 
countries on grounds of protection and stabilization of climate. Such unilateral measures 
would violate the principles and provisions of the Convention, including, in particular, those 
related to the principle of common but differentiated responsibilities (Article 3,paragraph 1); 
trade and climate change (Article 3 paragraph 5); and the relationship between mitigation 
actions of developing countries and provision of financial resources and technology by 
developed country parties (Article 4, paragraphs 3 and 7).
321
 
4.3.1 A plural approach within the UNFCCC 
 
It has been suggested that the way forward in addressing trade-related climate policy 
should be through separate agreements on some, but not all, of the issues of climate 
change among some, but not all, of the countries of the world. It is argued that adopting 
partial agreements on key aspects of climate change is a more realistic and strategic 
approach towards an ultimate global climate treaty.322 In other words, given the urgency of 
climate change, negotiations between some countries should move forward, even if we 
cannot muster the needed consensus for all countries to proceed with negotiations. Arguing 
in support of these ideas, James Bacchus, the former chairman of the AB of the WTO, refers 
to the gradual historical evolution of the GATT, which started with just 23 original 
contracting parties in 1948, into today’s WTO, with its 153 member countries and other 
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custom territories, and suggests that GATT might in many respects be a worthy model for 
the emerging international legal architecture for climate change.323 
 
Under the Copenhagen Accord, a plural approach seems to be contemplated. The language 
contained in the three page non-binding document establishes the basis for addressing 
important climate-related issues, such as, deforestation, mitigation funding, and technology 
transfer, through separate mechanisms among ‘coalitions of the willing’. These could 
function side-by-side with an emissions agreement, and together with a more focused and 
more limited United Nation (UN) process, in a plural approach towards attaining a shared 
global end.324 
 
However, a plural approach might not be efficient for the issue of BCA measures. As with a 
plurilateral agreement, discussed above, there are challenges with the limited legitimacy of 
such a deal due to its limited membership and with the enforcement mechanism, especially 
when such a plurilateral agreement is negotiated outside the WTO. Thus, inclusion of 
provisions on BCAs in RTAs concluded between WTO members looks more feasible. 
4.3.2 Joint UNFCCC and WTO solution 
 
It has also been proposed that negotiations can be carried out based on a joint working 
group consisting of the UNFCCC and the WTO. The establishment of a working group, 
specifically one focusing on greater coherence between trade, climate change and 
development policy, will help maximise synergies, while minimising the potential for 
conflict.325 Indeed, there are ways in which the WTO can help to combat climate change.326 
To date, most of all the all-too-little attention paid to the connection between trade and 
climate change has focused on how trade rules constrain national actions that would restrict 
international trade in products that have excessive carbon emissions in their production.327 
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This working group would focus on discussions about the technical aspects and trade 
implications of specific measures and flexibility mechanisms envisioned in any international 
agreement on climate change negotiated. This would bring the consideration of specific 
climate policies and their resulting trade effects to a multilateral level and, at the same time, 
ensure their close consistency with the WTO rules, thus maximising the WTO’s contribution 
to sustainable development.328 
 
However, the current situation in the WTO is that the UNFCCC secretariat has been granted 
observer status in the WTO Committee on Trade and Environment and is being invited to its 
negotiating sessions. Furthermore, WTO secretariat officials attend intergovernmental 
climate sessions.329 Although it has been argued that now is not the appropriate time to 
bring the issue of climate policy trade-related measures to the WTO due to the current 
climate at the Doha Round, addressing this issue through negotiation will minimise the 
likelihood of politically controversial litigation.330 Hence, it seems reasonable to have 
parallel negotiations on the use of trade measures for climate policy purposes in the 
UNFCCC and the WTO.331 Thus, a parallel negotiation in this context will assist the UNFCCC 
and WTO as they both work together to meet obligations and ensure that trade and 
environmental policies are mutually supportive. 
 
 On a contrary note, it has been argued that until a new international agreement on climate 
change framework comes into existence, and/or until the extent of unilateral climate-
change related trade measures becomes clearer, it would be unwise for WTO members to 
open parallel negotiations on the climate change trade issue. In other words, WTO members 
are best advised to focus their negotiating efforts on concluding the Doha Round,332 which is 
also important in the context of climate change.333 
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4.3.3 Conclusion 
 
This chapter has identified the various institutional solutions available under the WTO and 
the UNFCCC to address the likely violation of WTO rules by the implementation of climate 
policy trade-related measures, such as BCAs. These solutions include: the dispute 
settlement approach, plurilateral and bilateral negotiations, and even amending the WTO 
legal text. Nevertheless, each of them lacks either feasibility or effectiveness. Most of them 
will likely lack the political will necessary for their adoption to reach consensus or the 
required vote from WTO members. The plurilateral solution, even if adopted, would lack 
effectiveness, as it could be easily surmounted by members who are not parties to it. 
 
However, of all the approaches discussed above to address the problem of likely violation of 
WTO rules by the implementation of BCAs, the RTAs approach seems most feasible. In other 
words, it might be possible to include provisions on BCAs, including mutual recognition of 
climate policy actions refraining from using BCAs, in bilateral, regional or economic 
agreements. As mentioned above, the experience of the WTO shows that many sensitive 
trade-related issues were first negotiated at the regional level before been brought to 
multilateral negotiations. Provisions on BCA measures would just be part of a much broader 
economic agreement, which could include trade, investment, government procurement and 
other issues. 
  
Therefore, even if such provision went contrary to the interests of one of the parties to the 
agreement, there would always be something which could be given by the other parties in 
compensation for this, especially if one of the parties is a developed country who can 
exercise its political and economic power or can offer concessions in other areas. This 
chapter also noted that the inclusion of provisions on BCAs would largely depend on the 
objectives, nature and scope of the agreements, and that this is based on the fact that some 
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RTAs aim at establishing free-trade areas, while others seek to establish partnerships or 
regional integration. 
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CHAPTER FIVE 
Conclusions and recommendations 
 
5.1 Conclusions 
 
Climate change is a stark reality facing human existence. The impact of climate change is 
manifold and global in nature. The world’s leading scientific authority in the field, the 
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), presents strong and robust evidence 
that global temperatures are increasing, mainly due to human influences. Developing and 
least developed countries, and particularly the poorest and marginalised populations within 
these countries, will generally be the most adversely affected by the impacts of future 
climate change and will be the most vulnerable to effects, because they are less able to 
adapt than developed countries and their populations.  
 
In Chapter Two, this mini-thesis noted that climate change will significantly affect the 
agricultural sector in most African countries, presenting substantial development and trade 
challenges. The agricultural sector is considered to be one of the sectors most vulnerable to 
climate change, and also represents a key sector for international trade. It is projected that 
in many African countries and regions agricultural production, as well as access to food, will 
be severely compromised by climate variability and change. Not only will climate change 
threaten the livelihood of farmers, its impact will obviously affect the exporting capacity of 
most African countries.334 
 
Chapter Two of this mini-thesis also noted how climate change is likely to adversely affect a 
number of other sectors, particularly the tourism, fisheries and energy sectors. The tourism 
sector may be particularly vulnerable to climate change, for example through frequent 
flooding, drought and land degradation, all of which might lead potential tourists to 
perceive Africa as less attractive and consequently to seek new locations elsewhere. 
Climatic conditions such as air temperature and precipitation will also affect the fishery 
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sector, which, as noted in Chapter Two, is a key sector in a number of African countries and 
regions.  Climate change will also affect the energy sector, primarily through losses or 
changes in hydropower. 
 
In light of the global challenge of future climate change, countries have realised the need for 
a global answer to address such impacts. This is manifest in the various multilateral 
agreements negotiated by countries thus far. These multilateral efforts include: the United 
Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), the Kyoto Protocol, the 
Copenhagen Accord and the Cancun Agreements. This mini-thesis noted in Chapter Two 
that the UNFCCC was the first global effort to address climate change and that its main 
objective was for the stabilisation of greenhouse gas (GHG) concentrations in the 
atmosphere at a level that would prevent anthropogenic interference (i.e. interference 
resulting from human activity) with the climate system. The UNFCCC also reflects the 
principle of ‘common but differentiated responsibilities’, which recognises that even though 
all countries have the responsibility to address climate change, they have not all contributed 
to the same extent to causing the problem, nor are they all equally equipped to address it.  
 
The Kyoto Protocol came about as a result of the non-binding commitments under the 
UNFCCC. The protocol requires industrialised countries to meet agreed levels of emission 
reductions over an initial commitment period that runs from 2008–2012. This mini-thesis 
further noted that the purpose of the Copenhagen Accord was to map out a path beyond 
the Kyoto Protocol, but that the final outcome of the Copenhagen Accord, a three page non-
binding agreement, did not meet this goal.  The recent Cancun Agreements came about as a 
result of further efforts to reach a post-2012 agreement on climate change. The Cancun 
Conference was a huge success in that delegates agreed to aspects of a global framework to 
help developing countries curb their carbon output and cope with the effects of climate 
change, but they postponed the question of precisely how industrialised and major 
economies will share the task of making deeper GHG emissions cuts. 
 
Furthermore, this mini-thesis noted that there is a link between climate change and 
international trade. This is mainly through three effects: scale, composition and technique 
effects. An increase in the extent of trade and trade liberalisation would lead to an increase 
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in scale production. This could, in turn, lead to an increase in the extent of GHG emissions. 
This is referred to as the scale effect. Trade liberalisation also tends to change the mix of a 
country’s production in terms of the commodities in which it has a comparative advantage. 
Depending on whether or not these commodities are energy-intensive, there is a change in 
the pattern of that country’s GHGs. This term is referred to as the composition effect. 
Related to this concept is the technique effect. It is argued that trade liberalisation can also 
lead to more environmentally-friendly techniques of production being used. This can 
happen in two ways. Trade liberalisation might make available environmentally-friendly 
goods, services and technology, either through technology transfer or through affordability 
as a result of falling prices. Alternatively, increased incomes which might occur because of 
trade liberalisation might lead to an increased demand for cleaner technology, which would 
spur innovation and research. Trade and climate change linkages can also be viewed from 
other perspectives, including: the underlining principle establishing the regulatory bodies, 
legal perspectives and, finally, the likely impact of climate change on international trade. 
 
In an effort to achieve their commitments under the Kyoto Protocol developed countries 
have adopted unilateral trade-related measures, in view of the fact that the Kyoto Protocol 
does not prescribe measures for stabilising and reducing GHGs. One of such measure is a 
carbon tax which is accompanied by a border tax adjustment (BTA) and which is often 
referred to as border carbon adjustment (BCA) in the climate change context. A carbon tax 
is defined as a tax levied against products that emit carbon during the production process, 
while a border carbon adjustment measure is the application of a charge or tax on a carbon-
intensive product that is being imported into the country where a carbon tax is already 
levied against a similar domestically produced product and/or its inputs.  These types of 
measures are viewed from the WTO perspective as special measures, because they are 
imposed not on products directly, but on process and production methods (PPMs). The 
PPMs nature of BCAs makes their legality disputable, and the main issues here are the 
likeness of different PPMs products and the product-process distinction. These issues raise a 
number of legal questions. For instance, can taxes levied on production methods qualify as 
indirect taxes and thus be adjusted? Or, can two PPMs-non-identical products be considered 
not like? In other words, is it possible to treat products differently depending on the amount 
of GHGs emitted during their production? 
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This mini-thesis noted in Chapter Three that while the GATT expressly provides that indirect 
taxes can be adjusted at the border, it is really not clear whether BTAs on carbon emissions 
costs are permitted under the current rules on BTA considering that this tax is levied not on 
products but on the production methods. However, even if BTAs on carbon emissions are 
not permitted by the GATT rules, they could be justified under Article XX of the GATT. 
Further, there is every likelihood that if BCA measures are implemented they will most likely 
violate GATT Articles I and III. These Articles place some likely constraints on the 
implementation of BCAs. These constraints are not over limiting and can also be justified 
under the provision of Article XX. For instance, if any of the proposed legislation on BCAs 
excludes from its scope imports from countries that have emission cuts in place. In that case 
an ‘advantage’ will be granted to such countries above other countries that don’t have 
emissions cuts in place and therefore will be a violation of Article I of the GATT and, BCAs 
measures applied to the imported products ‘in excess of those applied to the domestic like 
products’ will be inconsistent with GATT Article III. 
 
This mini-thesis further noted that two exceptions are of particular relevance to a country 
that intends to justify a measure under Article XX: paragraph (b) and paragraph (g). 
According to these two paragraphs, WTO members may adopt policy measures that are 
inconsistent with GATT disciplines, but necessary to protect human, animal or plant life or 
health as provided in paragraph (b), or relating to the conservation of exhaustible natural 
resources as provided in paragraph (g).  Justifying a BCA measure under paragraph (b) will 
be very difficult considering the requirement of ‘necessity’. Thus, a BCA measure will most 
likely be justified under paragraph (g), which requires a less stringent requirement, namely 
‘relating to’. Further, this mini-thesis noted in Chapter Three that the main challenge under 
Article XX will be the provision of the chapeau, which requires that parties relying on the 
justification of Article XX must take into account conditions in other countries. In other 
words, it requires essentially that the measure should be flexible enough to treat more 
favourably imports from countries which had taken emission reduction efforts in any form, 
and to differentiate in treatment depending on a country’s level of economic development. 
If not, the measure could be found to amount to unjustifiable discrimination between 
countries where the same conditions prevail. It also requires that a measure should take 
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into consideration the rights and obligations of an exporting country under an international 
climate agreement. 
 
Finally, this mini-thesis noted that justification of violations of GATT rules under Article XX 
can only be achieved through litigation and this implies that any violation in the GATT rules 
will have to be brought before the WTO adjudicative bodies each time anew. In a quest to 
provide lasting solutions to the problem of violation of WTO rules by the implementation of 
BCA measures, this mini-thesis examined in Chapter Four various institutional solutions 
within the WTO and the UNFCCC legal frameworks. These institutional solutions might be 
achieved through a dispute settlement approach, through plurilateral and bilateral 
negotiations or even by amending the WTO legal text. Nevertheless, each of them lacks 
either feasibility or effectiveness. Most of them will likely lack the political will necessary for 
their adoption to reach consensus or the required vote from WTO members. 
 
5.2  Recommendations 
 
As indicated in Chapter Three of this mini-thesis, there is a high probability that the 
implementation of BCA measures will most likely violate GATT Articles I and III. Although the 
GATT rules are unclear as to whether or not carbon emissions can be adjusted at the border, 
but in other to address the likely violations of GATT rules that may arise as a result of the 
implementation of BCAs. This mini-thesis recommends the following notwithstanding these 
uncertainties. 
 
First, any violation of the GATT rules that may arise from the implementation of BCA 
measures can be justified under the environmental exceptions of GATT Article XX (g). This 
line of defense is needed in case (1) the WTO rules would not permit BTA for a process-
based tax or charge, or (2) the WTO does permit BTA but the adjustment is found to 
discriminate among imports as against products of the implementing country or between 
different sources of imports. For example, if the US did not impose BCAs on Europe, with 
their own emission cuts in place, or excluded some African developing countries. In such 
cases, a GATT violation would arise and could be justified under the exceptions of GATT 
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Article XX (g). Furthermore, for BCA measures to properly fit into the requirement of the 
chapeau if it violates any GATT rules. This mini-thesis presumes that it would be more 
reasonable to apply import carbon tariffs, rather than BCA measures. This is because of the 
intrinsic competition-related motives of BCAs, and the traditionally symmetric application of 
border adjustment to imports and exports (which in the case of export rebates runs 
contrary to climate policy objectives).  
 
Secondly, in light of the fact that justification of a measure under Article XX can only be 
achieved through litigation and this will entail bringing different disputes before WTO 
adjudicative bodies each time anew, this mini-thesis recommends that a long-lasting 
solution to address the likely violation of GATT rules by the implementation of BCAs can be 
achieved through the use of RTAs. The RTAs approach seems most feasible. In other words, 
it might be possible to include provisions on BCAs, including mutual recognition of climate 
policy actions refraining from using BCA measures, in bilateral, regional or economic 
agreements. The experience of the WTO shows that many sensitive trade-related issues 
were first negotiated at the regional level before being brought to multilateral negotiations. 
Thus, the inclusion of BCA measures in RTA would just be part of a much broader economic 
agreement, which could include trade, investment, government procurement and other 
issues. Therefore, even if such provision goes contrary to the interests of one of the parties 
to the agreement, there would always be something which would be given by the other 
parties in compensation for this, especially if one of the parties is a developed country 
which can exercise its political and economic power or can offer concessions in other areas. 
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